Tuesday, September 26, 2017

Race and Racial Groups

Latinas and Human Rights Idea

Berta Esperanza Herndez-Truyol


Excerpted from: Latinas, Culture and Human Rights: a Model for Making Change, Saving Soul, Women's Rights Law Reporter 21-43, 22-30 (Summer/Fall 2001) (189 footnotes)

 

The issues of race, gender, and culture are salient considerations in exploring the human rights dimension to an analysis of Latinas' location in societies and in using the model to advance that position. Latinas, inside and outside the United States, must operate within a complex system of culturally derived racialization and sexualization. Within majority communities, Latinas are racial 'others,' subordinated because their racialized ethnic origins separate them from the normative standards of personhood. Moreover, within their own communities, whether inside or outside the United States, Latinas become second class because of their sex, a deeply-imbedded cultural trope that is definitional of women's worth and particularized roles. Both locally and abroad, women's distance from normal can be exacerbated if they are racial (and sexual) others within their own communities.

An interrogation of the possible interventions that human rights norms can afford Latinas, requires a scrutinization of the available instruments that afford useful strategies for the progressive development of women in the Americas. Specifically, a consideration of the utility of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and various regional documents that address issues pertinent to women in the Americas is necessary.

A. Varied Conceptions of Race, Ethnicity, and National Origin

An examination of CERD reveals some striking features. Although from its name this is anything but apparent, CERD is not solely a race convention; indeed, it provides:

In this Convention, the term 'racial discrimination' shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.

This definition both presents and depicts the problem in talking about race and ethnicity: CERD defines ethnicity as, and therefore conflates it with, race.

However, in most places in the Americas, race and ethnicity are different classifications. *23 To be sure, there can exist inter-ethnic racial conflicts and inter-racial ethnic conflicts, which are all but obscured if race and ethnicity are rendered synonymous categories. Beyond collapsing race and ethnicity, CERD conflates race with color, descent, and national origin. These, too, are matters related to, indeed interdependent with, but separate from race or ethnicity.

Such racialization-of-differences paradigm is the predominant view of difference within the United States - where national and ethnic identities are considered racial differences. The translation of this local idiosyncrasy to a global definition unearths the hegemonic underpinnings of international norms. Moreover, this inaccurate definition, disseminated and adopted world-wide as law, reinforces a one-axis approach to analysis of identity rather than the more accurate multidimensionality perspective. Indeed, a multidimensionality perspective is much more realistic in the context of the human condition and our daily existence.

Beyond the incoherent definition of race in CERD, it is also important to understand that different cultural groups have different understandings of the concept of race. One brief but poignant example effectively crystallizes the divergent dominant and silenced social constructions of race. Inherently, the Latina/o and the United States constructions of race "are polar opposites." Indeed, in the United States, the central, essential, axiomatic paradigm that courts religiously accept, believe in,and impose is the 'one drop' rule. This model dictates that, regardless of phenotype, one drop of black blood makes a person black. Under this logic, there is no amount of 'whitening' that can render one white, normatively speaking. As Gunnar Myrdal has articulately described,

The 'Negro race' is defined in America by the white people. It is defined in terms of parentage. Everybody having a known trace of Negro blood in his veins - no matter how far back it was acquired - is classified as a Negro. No amount of white ancestry, except one hundred percent, will permit entrance to the white race.

To be sure, case law adopts this approach:

'[W]hite persons' within the meaning of the statute are members of the Caucasian race, as Caucasian is defined in the understanding of the mass of men. . . . The term excludes . . . American Indians. . . . Nor is the range of the exclusion limited to persons of the full blood. . . . [M]en are not white if the strain of colored blood in them is a half or a quarter, or, not improbably, even less, the governing test always . . . being that of common understanding.

In stark contrast to this historically derived United States social construction of race is the caribe/o social construction that subscribes to the notion of blanqueamiento (whitening) - ironically a 'one drop' rule of sorts. Pursuant to this version, however, the paradigm is reversed: 'one drop of white blood starts you on the [desirable] route to . . . whiteness.'

It is noteworthy, however, that while Latinas/os and Anglas/os differ on their respective constructions of race, they agree on the favored race: white. From the Latina/o lens, this represents the colonized internalization "of the colonizer's predilection" for whiteness as reflected in the Spaniards' carry- over to the New World *24 of their racial biases as represented by the "expulsion of Jews and Arabs from Spain." During colonization, to ensure 'purity of blood,' the Spaniards established a complex system of racial categorizations that included the prohibition of public office holders from having a 'taint of Indian, Jewish, or Arabic blood." These categorizations survive today, albeit in an informal fashion, in the South, Central, Latin Americas, and the caribe and form the basis of unstated, buried, complex forms of racisms that while rather different from those existing in the United States nevertheless prevail and pervade all social locations.

These differences in social construction of race/ethnicity between the majority and Latinas/os result in peculiar outcomes that are only explicable by the dramatically divergent cultural racial perspectives. In fact, statistical reports reveal that approximately 95% of Latinas/os identify themselves as white notwithstanding the 'fact [that] most [Latinas/os] [are] racially mixed, including combinations of European White, African Black, and American Indian . . . .' Contrasted to this Latina/o self-identification, if one considers the United States construction of race, it is an impossibility for 95% of Latinas/os to be classified as white. Nevertheless, this is the Latinas/os' own truth.

Significantly, international human rights norms which protect against discrimination on the bases of 'race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status' should easily be able to negotiate racial and ethnic paradigms that differ from each other based on cultural perceptions. However, CERD's version, by collapsing myriad different categories into 'race' appears to impose one particular racial interpretation - one that comports to the dominant view within the United States.

The different bases and histories of racisms, as well as the different forms in which racial/ethnic prejudice manifests itself in different societies, suggest that it would be appropriate first to deconstruct and then to reconstruct the definition of racial discrimination contained in CERD. This would allow inquiries that can lead to understandings of their origins and current manifestations of socialized views in diverse cultural settings. Indeed, a reconstructed paradigm that allows global discourses across cultures would embrace different peoples' varied realities and would permit the attainment of better human understandings and harmony. Only then will equality be attainable. To be sure, only such process will permit the eradication of the ethnic and racial subordination that Latinas/os experience within the United States, and the gender based subordination Latinas experience within their own communities - both within and outside of the borderlands of the United States.

Thus, as a beginning point to urge a human rights model for progress for Latinas in the Americas, we need to re-imagine CERD in a global fashion. The covenant must not only continue to protect Latinas against discrimination on the basis of race, but it also must protect the other covered categories as phenomena and possible sites of oppressions that are different from, or simply confounded by, race.

For all Latinas/os, regardless of whether they are raised within or outside the United States fronteras, their identity narratives are "based upon [their] ethnic/national origin/social/cultural identity." However, while "[f]or the Latinas/os outside the United States, this is the dominant" 'normative' paradigm, for those *25 raised within the United States this paradigm loses normativity as it is subordinated to the United States' dominant racial paradigms. Thus the serendipitous geographic location of Latinas/os defines their racial/ethnic self-identification as valid or aberrant. The instruments that we use to protect these multiple interdependent and indivisible categories, as well as the interpretive process in their application, need the fluidity and flexibility not to essentialize and to permit the mapping of these different geographies regardless of location. Indeed, the documents need to validate, rather than negate, multicultural legitimacy.

B. The Omission of Sex as an Element of Discrimination

Another reality is that CERD does not at all consider sex in the context of racial discrimination. This observation regards both race and issues of sex/gender. Indeed, CERD's preamble is a prime example of why we have to insist upon a new construction of these documents that consciously and methodically considers sex. In its preamble, the Race Convention makes reference to the non-discrimination principles of the United Nations' Charter as well as the Universal Declaration, both of which include sex. Yet, CERD then continues by providing for the entitlement of rights and freedoms therein 'without distinction of any kind, in particular as to race, colour, or national origin' excluding sex. This is both significant and tragic because there are documented gendered dimensions of racial discriminations.

It is important to explore both the successes of international instruments as tools for women's progress and emancipation as well as the erasure of sex from both international and regional instruments, even in contexts that particularly affect women. It also is necessary to addresses the inescapable gendered dimensions ofracial discrimination - particularly a definition that conflates ethnicity, descent, national and ethnic origin. For example, it is necessary to explore the complex nature of cultural protections to recognize that culture can be both a tool of the oppressor to decimate tradition and a weapon of tradition to decimate women.

Sadly, our world is replete with present day examples of gendered tragedies - from honor killings in India and Brazil, to de jure disenfranchisement of women in some states and de facto denial of suffrage to the poor in virtually every state; from segregation (as varied as the Taliban's assault on women in Afghanistan, job apartheid worldwide, and the Black/White wealth disparities in the U.S.) to blatant sex *26 and gender discrimination and stereotyping; from physical violence to economic assaults; from rape for ethnic cleansing to rape for sport.

In reviewing the realities of women's lives worldwide in the context of international human rights, two distressing facts surface. First, the rules are, at best, imperfect and, at worst, venal in effecting women's exclusion - silencing women's voices, rendering women invisible, relegating women to second-class citizenship. Second, women simply do not universally enjoy human rights, as the examples above demonstrate.

To be sure, this is as true in the West as in the East; in the North as in the South. Regardless of the indicators used - employment, economics, education, personal autonomy, political participation, health, or personal security (meaning freedom from all types of violence), all concerns purportedly protected by international human rights documents - women remain a subordinated class. Notwithstanding our legal rights, 'the universal [reality] is that women are routinely subjected to torture, starvation, terrorism, humiliation, mutilation, rape, . . . health risks [(maternity and otherwise related)], economic duress, and sexual exploitation, simply because of [our] sex.' Our ethnicity, color, race, and national or social origins are often aggravating factors.

It is significant that women have made phenomenal strides in crossing race, color, class, culture, religion, and language borderlands in order to promote and protect women's rights and address their concerns. At the 1993 Human Rights Conference in Austria, women from all walks of life united to put women at the center of a human rights meeting that originally did not even include women in its agenda. An exciting momentum was created that could not be stopped and women from all corners of the world continued this gender-based coalition in Cairo, Rio de Janeiro, Vienna, and Beijing.

A great achievement in promoting the full citizenship of women is CEDAW, which by focusing on all ranges of gender issues - from the public to the private, from the economic to the cultural, from the social to the political, from the family to the government - not only recognizes the need for, but also reinforces, the indivisibility construct. CEDAW embraces women as the complex, multidimensional beings they are. It takes a holistic approach towards women from all walks of life attaining full personhood by recognizing the importance not only of civil and political rights but also of social, economic, cultural, and solidarity rights. This treaty, along with other gender specific documents and perspectives recently embraced by the global community as well as the recognition of the need for gender perspectives in general documents (such as the International Criminal Court statute), are (can be) the foundation for making women's equality an accessible reality. Regrettably, however, CEDAW's failing is that it does not integrate race into its gender-centered construct, a vacuum that parallels *27 the failure of CERD to integrate gender into race-centered construct.

These realities reflect the urgent need to restructure and reinvigorate the human rights vision by making interdependence and indivisibility an actuality in human rights analysis and in all human rights documents. There are several examples of locations where the interdependence focus would enrich the discourses. For instance, in Article 20, the ICCPR provides that '[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.' However, Article 20 does not include a prohibition against incitement to discrimination or violence on the grounds of sex, although sex is one of the categories in the general anti-discrimination clause as well as a basis upon which much violence is experienced. Similarly, it is noteworthy that article 13 of the Economic Covenant which provides that 'education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . [and] shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups. . . ' omits sex from the specifically enumerated grounds for promotion of tolerance through education. Significantly, the need for better educational opportunities for women and female children as a means of attaining equality is emphasized in the documents that emerged from the Vienna, Cairo, Copenhagen, and Beijing conferences.

Regional documents are similarly flawed. The American Convention (Article 13(5)) has a provision almost identical to the above-described Article 20 of the ICCPR. Additionally, the African Charter excludes sex from its Article 12(5) prohibition against mass expulsions, a gendered exclusion that is particularly tragic because women and their children comprise 70-80% of the world's refugees.

So, while in theory international and regional documents, without exception, include non-discrimination principles, including sex, at their core, sex is frequently forgotten. This is of particular concern to women of color whose multidimensionality crosses the borders of sex, race, ethnicity, and national origin on a daily basis.

C. The Creation of a Gendered Underclass

Of particular concern to women of the Americas are the normative gendered cultural standards that conspire with sex to create a gendered underclass - a group of olvidadas. To be sure, it is not an easy task to talk about culture when the group being scrutinized is one as diverse as Latinas/os. Indeed, this group has internally distinct and varied languages, migration, education, emancipation, and political histories. 'Roots within the territory now known *28 as the United States are varied, the language of home is not easily predictable, racial composition is best described as mestizaje - [although] within the U.S. borderlands Latinas/os cannot be white because they are Latina/o.'

Yet, while recognizing the diversities that exist between and among the panethnic groups collectively catalogued under the umbrella of the Latina/o label, it is inescapable that the group does indeed share many cultural commonalties. Many of these converge around the importance of family and firm notions about appropriate sex and gender roles - two interconnected foundations of cultural oppression for Latinas. Throughout the Americas - North, South, Central and the Caribbean - women are considered an 'other' from the male norm. They are constructed by the dominant sex as the second sex, all in comparison to the created norm.

Latinas, because of cultural tropes, face additional burdens. In North America, for normativas the axis for sex-subordination is the isolatable single trait of sex. In terms of race, ethnicity, national origin, and language, Anglas are the gendered reflection of the normativo (except, of course, women who also are sexual minorities). For women of the other Americas, the situation is more complicated because the deployment of animus - either at home or abroad - can also be based upon the combination of their sex and their color, accent, appearance, ethnicity, class, and/or national origin. This model is grounded on the cultural expectations that conspire with gendered oppressions to create standards for and interpretations of sex (meaning sex, gender, and sexuality) that subordinate women. Not only do women of color experience the sexism, classism, ethnocentrism, nativism, and racism of the majority culture, they must also contend with the sexism, racism, and classism within their own culture. The dominant culture's gendered borders render all women less than full citizens simply because of their sex. The cultural gendered borders create for women of color a gendered underclass within her own comunidad.

As an example of the impact of cultural norms on Latinas, it is interesting to examine the role of family in defining women's location in society. "La familia is of sacrosanct importance in the cultura Latina. It also is the site initially and continuously responsible for the creation, construction, and constitution of gendered identities."

Our families operate on the extended family model in which abuelas y abuelos are respected and revered, ts y ts are effectively second sets of parents, and primas/os are like additional hermanas/os. This big tent is where we first learn about appropriate and proper conduct, including sex roles, from several generations. These generationally unchanging molds in turn become proof of the correctness of the point, about our proper and befitting places; what conduct is suitable and acceptable; and what comportments and performances constitute cosas feas (ugly things).

Inevitably bridging the diversities among Latinas/os, these learnings and knowledges about fitting demeanor are universally and uniformly gen- dered and sexualized. La cultura Latina rigorously and authoritatively defines, delineates, and enforces gender *29 identities. These fronteras are then used as a tool of oppression and pressure to marginalize those mujeres (andhombres) who do not conform to culturally accepted (and acceptable) designations of gender and sex roles and norms.

Frequently, strong religious ties in many communities of color also aggravate women's gender subordination. For example, in the cultura Latina the Latina's identity is developed in the context of the 'ideal' woman fabricated in the mold of the Virgin Mary, a construct called Marianismo that glorifies Latinas as 'strong, long-suffering women who have endured and kept la cultura Latina and the family intact.' Marianismo is about living in the shadow of all your men - father, boyfriend, son, husband, brother - and your family. Self-sacrifice is lauded. (Mind you, these cultural proscriptions have broad socio-economic consequences: Latinas are the poorest of any demographic group in the United States.) Denial of personhood becomes a virtue instead of a human rights violation.

D. Nuevas Teors: Protection from Harmful Cultural Norms

Women of the Americas provide an interesting twist to the international universalist versus relativist debate. Women of color, whose strongest source of support often comes from community, family, and church are caught in the conundrum that these institutions also dictate cultural norms that are complicit in their oppression and subordination. Thus, ironically, the concept of culture protected in the international sphere, can be used both to subordinate non-dominant cultures in the name of law or to perpetuate women's subordination in the name of cultural tradition.

In this context, our nuevas teors must promote the concept of a benevolent, non-discriminatory, non-subordinating respect for women across cultures. A new paradigm, while embracing and being sensitive to cultural differences, must simultaneously reject oppressive aspects of culture, particularly sex-subordinating or sex-marginalizing practices or beliefs. The project must confront both the internal and external components of the sources of oppression for women of color.

International human rights documents provide a model for such an approach. While treaties consistently address culture as a basis upon which protections must be afforded, not one cites to cultura as the grounds upon which other protected rights may be abridged. For example CEDAW at article 2(f) mandates States Parties to 'take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women.' In fact, the Women's Convention goes so far as to require States Parties to

take all appropriate measures . . . [t]o modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.

Another significant example of the way international instruments seek to protect women from harmful cultural norms is found in the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child which expressly balances cultural rights and pretexts to disempower or harm persons simply because of their sex. The Charter requires member states of the Organization of African Unity to 'abolish customs and practices harmful to the welfare, normal growth and development of the child, and in particular . . . those customs and practices discriminatory to the child on the grounds of sex or other status.' Similarly, The Convention on the Rights *30 of the Child requires State Parties to 'take all effective and appropriate measureswith a view to abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children. '

These examples show that there are dire social, political, civil, and cultural consequences to being a woman of color. Considering the above- enumerated observations about Latina/o cultural tropes, culture, in addition to sex and race, becomes an important focus for a discussion of equality and human rights with respect to women in the Americas. Human rights norms expressly protect culture and cultural expressions as well as equality and non- discrimination. These protections are extended to minority cultures living within a dominant culture as well as to cultural dissenters within their own cultural settings. Cultural protections are especially significant in human rights analyses because they were crafted with the knowledge and understanding that implicitly recognizes that ethnic minorities are particularly vulnerable to a tyrannical majority's whims in denying rights - be this majority the so-called normative community or the empowered within a minority community. To be sure, such concerns and consideration should extend to all women within any culture as well as to minority women within their minority culture.

Latinos Nowhere in Sight: Erased by Racism, Nativism, the Black-white Binary, and Authoritarianism

Camilo M. Ortiz


Camilo M. Ortiz , Latinos Nowhere in Sight: Erased by Racism, Nativism, the Black-white Binary, and Authoritarianism , 13 Rutgers Race & the Law Review 29 (2012) (150 Footnotes Omitted)



In May 2010, two weeks after the Arizona state legislature passed Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070), Juan Varela was fatally shot in the neck by his next door neighbor, Gary Kelley. Prior to the killing, Kelley had repeatedly said to Varela, “Hurry up and go back to Mexico, or you're gonna die[!] ” It is uncertain what specific events led Kelley to shoot Varela in his front yard. However, it is known that Varela was not a recent arrival to the United States, but rather a second-generation, native-born U.S. citizen.

In the days that followed Varela's murder, local news reporters speculated that the shooting might have resulted from the numerous altercations that had occurred between Kelley and Varela, was the result of the intoxicated state Kelley appeared to be in at the time of the shooting, or even that the killing was just a sudden and unexplained act by Kelley, since he always got along with his other Latino neighbors. Other news reports speculated that the motive behind the murder of Varela might have been linked to America's fear of and distaste towards immigrants. This link between Varela's murder and America's panic towards Mexican immigrants is logical. After all, cable television commentators, local radio show hosts, and politicians have repeated and endorsed the ideas that all undocumented individuals from Mexico are criminals, secretly harbor a “reconquista” agenda, and are responsible for the rise in infectious diseases in the United States.

Some scholars have speculated that, in general, anti-Latino violence, including anti-immigrant violence, is directly linked to nativism. Akin to nationalists, American nativists maintain that national unity is built on the belief that the United States is made up of insiders and outsiders: insiders who belong to the nation, and outsiders who are in the nation, but not of it. To American nativists, insiders are native-born citizens who have assimilated the dominant culture through the removal of any foreign connections. Conversely, American nativists see outsiders as “foreign” or “un-American” individuals who have threatened the American way of life because they have failed to assimilate into the dominant Anglo-American national identity. However, a nativist's dislike of a U.S. citizen like Varela results from a different form of nativism which other scholars have termed racialized nativism. A combination of racism and nativism, racialized nativism targets particular ethnic groups, like Latinos, as foreigners in the United States and views them as societal threats specifically because of their “physical features or cultural traits . . . .” To the racist nativist, Latino native-born U.S. citizens living in the United States are perceived as outsiders because of their Spanish surnames, non-Anglo culture, and non-Anglo physical appearance. They are thus unlike European immigrants who were considered foreigners by eighteenth and nineteenth century nativists, but were nevertheless, able successfully to assimilate into the dominant Anglo culture because they were not immigrants of color.

Seen in this light, anti-Latino violence is particularly intractable because Latinos find themselves at the center of both nativism and racism. Nativism is premised on the idea that Others coming into the nation have to assimilate into the dominant Anglo culture through the elimination of their foreign traits. Racism is premised on the idea that Others (such as Latino U.S. citizens) who are in this country should be excluded from the dominant Anglo culture because of their alleged barbarism and uncivilized nature. Thus, Latinos, whether documented or not, find themselves denied full acceptance by the dominant Anglo culture because they are viewed as either internal or external threats to the nation.

Anti-Latino violence may also be a function of the ambiguous categorization of Latinos within the predominant social discourse. While the black-white paradigm of American racial thought illuminates a core piece of American history and society, including the centrality of slavery and white racism, it also focuses on two constituent racial groups, the Black and the White. As such, the binary not only marginalizes other people of color, but also omits their history and struggle for equality. These non-black, non-white Others are, therefore, rendered racially ambiguous.

In particular, the black-white paradigm converts racial discrimination against Latinos as perceived “foreigners,” by analogy, into some familiar shared experience with either blacks or whites, but not in terms of their own unique brown experience. Latinos emerge as an absent racial/ethnic group; they are racially ambiguous. If viewed as if they were black, they are deemed to be racially inferior to whites, even though Latinos do not share the same historical and recognizable experiences as blacks. Or, if Latinos are viewed as white, they are considered racially superior to blacks, even though they do not share the same political, economic, or social privileges as Anglos. Thus, in the minds of many Anglo-Americans, violence against Latinos is neither clearly decipherable nor readily redressable; it is vague, unstructured, and therefore tolerated.

In this article, I argue that the psychological concept of authoritarianism enables the theories of racism, nativism, and the black-white paradigm to merge and explain Anglo prejudice and violence against Latinos in the United States. As a distinct phenomenon made popular by social scientists in the 1950s, authoritarianism describes a type of personality with a philosophy and attitude towards life that seeks conditions that limit human freedom. Most notably, the authoritarian personality has a predominant set of well-defined traits which include, among others: intolerance for ambiguity, conventionalism, suspicion of the Other, and closed-mindedness. Thus, as a personality type that thrives on fear, hate, and ignorance, the authoritarian operates through power, dominance, and irrational beliefs against those who challenge convention.

Through the authoritarian lens, violence against Latinos emerges as a specific distaste towards immigration because authoritarianism is suspicious and distrustful of outsiders. Violence against Latinos also emerges as a product of nativism because authoritarianism seeks to maintain order and national unity. It can also be seen as a result of Latinos' ambiguous racial categorization within the black-white binary because authoritarianism seeks conformity, certainty, and clear lines and categories (us-them; black-white).

Thus, under the authoritarian personality theory, the murder of Varela can be understood as an interconnection between anti-immigration sentiments, racialized nativism, and the ambiguous racial categorization of Latinos such as Varela. Viewed in this manner, the historical context and the crimes against Latinos are acknowledged, as well as the necessity of considering such violence as hate crimes with all the serious political and racial consequence that this entails.

Part Two provides an overview of two significant historical periods, the 1850s and the 1940s, when Mexican-Americans were publicly persecuted through lynchings and legal manipulation resulting from prevailing racist, nativist, and authoritarian attitudes towards that group. I will show that the present day violence against Latinos, as exemplified by the murder of Juan Varela, is directly tied to the historical, racial nativist, and authoritarian beliefs that first came to light in mid-nineteenth and twentieth century America. Part Three examines the relationships among nativism, racism, and the black-white paradigm of race. Part Four discusses the key role that authoritarianism plays within this framework and in the context of Latinos in the United States. My analysis provides a more comprehensive lens through which to examine the Varela murder. It is also highly instructive with regard to the situation of all Latinos in the United States who are viewed as targets or become victims of racism, nativism, and authoritarianism.


II. History

To understand contemporary aggressive nativist, racist, and authoritarian attitudes toward Latinos, specifically Mexican Americans, one must begin historically at the end of the Mexican-American War. In 1848, many Mexicans and vast stretches of their sovereign land came under the control of the United States. As a result, at least 75,000 Mexicans were forced to decide whether or not to become U.S. citizens. Of those who voluntarily consented to U.S. citizenship, any constitutional protection afforded to them by the final amended version of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848 was minimized because the full constitutional rights of Mexicans, as U.S. citizens, were to arrive at “the proper time [which was determined] by the Congress of the United States.” As a result, and in due course, Mexicans who opted for U.S. citizenship were denied the right to vote, the title to their land, political representation, and the status of anything other than second-class citizens.

Thus, after 1848, through the Anglo-American political, legal, and territorial conquest of Mexicans, a popularized racial, cultural, and religious sense of superiority took shape among Anglos, which framed Mexicans as a group who were separate, but part of the dominant U.S. territories, and not a prized part, either. With few legal or political protections and without individual importance, Mexicans became the “Others” or foreigners. They were different because of the color of their skin, the language they spoke, the religion they practiced, and the customs they shared. As James Buchanan, then Secretary of State under President James K. Polk, put it, Mexicans were “the imbecile and indolent” race whose “bastard civilization” did not “possess the elements of an independent national existence . . . .”

With wealth and power fueling the Anglo conquest of Mexico, any resulting suffering or maltreatment of Mexican people emerged as a consequence of their racial and cultural weaknesses and not of the Anglos' unrelenting pursuit of power and territory. By classifying Mexicans as Others, not only did the Anglo-Americans justify their methodical, authoritarian, and relentless expansion with a clear conscience, but also established a national unity of insiders and an exclusion of outsiders.

Not surprisingly, the ways in which Anglo-Americans viewed Mexicans as Others found expression in verbal assaults against Mexicans, as well as in physical beatings and mob lynchings. According to several scholars, over a seventy-year period beginning in 1848, at least 597 Mexicans were lynched by mobs in the United States. Based on some estimates, Mexicans were lynched at a rate of 473 per 100,000 of population between the period of 1848 and 1879. In fact, when compared to the rate of lynchings of African-Americans between 1880 and 1930, in certain Southern states, the rate of Mexican lynchings surpassed that of African Americans; and if not, was nearly equal to it. To no one's surprise, the lynchings of Mexicans were only spurred on by the increasing number of local Mexicans who protested or who otherwise engaged in acts of resistance.

In all instances, the lynching of Mexicans was understood and accepted by the Anglo-American population to be the proper response to the non-conforming and barbaric Mexicans who allegedly were “making advances toward [] white wom[e] n, cheating at cards, . . . and refusing to leave land that Anglos coveted . . . .” This was exemplified by the case of Jesús Romo, who was arrested for robbery in June 1874, taken from the custody of the arresting officers by a group of masked men, and publicly hanged. The lynching of Mexicans, a form of vigilante justice, was based on the belief in the Anglo-American community that it was a “civic virtue” to do so. To the Anglo-American people, the lynching of Mexicans was not only expected, but was also promoted for the betterment of Anglo society.

The same pattern of blithe, even celebratory, treatment reappeared a hundred years later when Mexicans were a large part of the U.S. labor force and the country entered into the Second World War. Earlier, the 1930s had seen the underhanded, mass deportations of Mexicans and Mexican-Americans to Mexico. The underlying reason for this was that local and state governments were unable to support the surplus of foreign labor, which they had requested a decade earlier to fill shortages in the growing agricultural and industrial industries. But now Mexican-Americans, from 1930 to 1940, were cast out by Anglo society. Like the U.S. territorial expansion in the 1840s, Mexican-Americans in the 1930s found themselves threatened, beaten, and viewed as foreigners or Others in a land they helped to develop and, indeed, had once owned.

By the 1940s, Mexican-Americans were welcomed back by Anglo society to fill jobs once occupied by Anglo-Americans and now vacant due to the war. However, the mistreatment of Mexican-Americans continued, fueled in part by the Bracero Program, which allowed Mexican citizens to work temporarily in the United States and help with the labor shortage. With little oversight, Mexican workers were unrelentingly subjected to oppressive working conditions and physical mistreatment.

Segregation between Mexicans-Americans and Anglos prevailed in many public facilities, including movie theatres, schools, and swimming pools , not unlike the situation between whites and African-Americans. In parts of California, Mexicans and Blacks were often only allowed to swim on Wednesdays because that was the day the pool was to be drained and cleaned. Considered cheap, dirty, and expendable by employers and Anglo peers, Mexican immigrants and Mexican-Americans in the United States were forced to live as second-class citizens.

Mexicans were not the only ethnic group to suffer the sting of discrimination. The Alien Registration Act in 1940, an effort by the U.S. government to prevent the much-feared overthrow of the government, required, among other things, the registration and fingerprinting of all alien residents over fourteen years old. Two years later, in 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, mandating the evacuation and internment of approximately 120,000 Japanese-Americans living on U.S. soil. Additionally, by 1942, the populations of large U.S. cities, in particular Los Angeles, grew exponentially as waves of Mexican immigrants moved in to seek employment in industrial jobs.

By 1942, the country experienced the legalized ill-treatment of the Bracero workers, the congressional fear of a communist takeover, the imprisonment of Japanese Americans, the entry into the Second World War, and the swell of migration of all races to major U.S. cities. In the wake of these powerful events, fear, anger, and distrust took hold in the minds of Anglo-Americans, particularly in Los Angeles. On August 1, 1942, in Los Angeles County, José Díaz was found dead in an abandoned reservoir, dubbed the Sleepy Lagoon after a popular song of the day. Although the L.A. medical examiner found that Diaz's injuries were consistent with a hit-and-run accident, the local police authorities speculated that his death was the result of a retaliatory beating by the 38th Street Club whose members had been beaten by a group of boys from a rival neighborhood cohort the night before. There was no indication that Díaz was part of a rival neighborhood or a participant in the assault against the 38th Street Club. Moreover, there was no forensic evidence that Díaz's death was caused by members of the 38th Street Club. Díaz was simply at a location where the members of the 38th Street Club had decided to congregate.

Immediately following Díaz's murder, local newspapers sensationalized the story and urged the local police authorities to deal with the “Pachucos” and young “hoodlums” who they claimed contributed to the alleged rampant Mexican crime wave in Los Angeles. The police arrested more than 600 Mexican youths over two nights to “‘make the streets safe for everyone.”’

Fueled by the public's paranoid fear of Mexican youth, Captain E. Duran Ayres, Chief of the Foreign Relations Bureau of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office submitted a “statistical” report (“Ayres Report”) to the grand jury in response to Díaz's murder. Ayers sought to distinguish and explain “the Mexican problem” that plagued L.A.:

All [a Mexican] knows and feels is a desire to use a knife or some lethal weapon. In other words, his desire is to kill, or at least let blood. And, ‘[w] hen there is added to this inborn characteristic that has come down through the ages, the use of liquor, then we certainly have crimes of violence.’

The Ayres Report further explained that as descendants of Aztecs who allegedly sacrificed 30,000 victims a day, Mexican Americans were naturally cruel and violent. Therefore, the solution to the present problem of the alleged Mexican-American crime wave was imprisonment. The Ayres Report represented the official view of the Los Angeles law enforcement.

At the Sleepy Lagoon trial, none of the twenty-two Mexican youths indicted for the murder of Díaz were allowed to change their clothes or cut their hair for the duration of the judicial proceeding. None of the defendants were allowed to sit or talk with their lawyer. Furthermore, not only did the prosecution fail to prove the twenty-two Mexican youths were part of a gang, but also it failed to introduce sufficient evidence to connect any of the defendants to the murder of Díaz.

Nonetheless, the trial court found seventeen of the twenty-two defendants guilty and doled out a range of punishments for offenses ranging from assault to first-degree murder. On October 4, 1944, with the help of the Sleepy Lagoon Defense Committee, the state Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's sentence on the grounds that the defendants' due process rights had been violated. Of the twelve Mexican-American youths convicted of first-degree murder, all had been incarcerated for a minimum of two years in prison before their official release in 1944. A year after the Sleepy Lagoon trial began, tensions between Mexican Americans and Anglos in Los Angeles continued to worsen. In particular, a series of altercations between Mexican-American youths and Anglo servicemen occurred, eventually leading to the “Zoot Suit Riots” or “Sailor Riots” over a four-day period in the summer of 1943. Beginning on May 30, 1943, a clash between a dozen sailors and Mexican-American youths broke out, ending with one sailor left unconscious. In response, approximately fifty sailors with concealed weapons sought revenge and targeted all Mexican-American youths wearing zoot suits. The sailors yelled: “Let's get the chili-eating bastards!” With the police taking the side of the sailors, Mexican-American youths were beaten and stripped of their clothing. As word spread that Pachucos could be attacked without fear of arrest, the sailors, together with two hundred allies, returned the following night in twenty hired cabs and conducted a “search and destroy” raid against all Mexican-American youths who lived in the East Los Angeles barrio.

Because the police maintained that they could not establish contact with the sailors and the press portrayed the sailors as heroes, the sailors continued to maraud for two more nights, freely assaulting any Mexican-American they saw. At the climax of the Zoot Suit Riots, approximately five thousand soldiers, sailors, and civilians took to the streets of Los Angeles seeking to assault not just Mexican Americans, but also Filipinos and African Americans.

By the time the Zoot Suit Riots had officially ended, more than 600 Mexican-American youths had been arrested as a “preventive” measure. Conversely, the sailors or the civilians who had participated in the riots and assaults were never charged with any crime because the city officials found that they had acted in self-defense.


III. Is Anti-Latino Violence Based on Racism? Anti-Immigrant Nativism? Or the Result of the Black/White Binary?

Whether anti-Latino violence is racist, nativist, or a result of the black/white binary depends upon the theoretical lens through which such violence is viewed. For instance, the murder of Varela should be scrutinized through a racist lens where the dominant narrative of race teaches that certain cultures are more superior to others or that the white majority group is, for the most part, “innocent” of racial discrimination. Varela's murder could, then, be understood to be a result of Kelley's customary “assertion of [racial] supremacy,” which maintains a cultural order based on, among other things, distinctive physical traits. With Varela's bronze-colored skin, indigenous-looking eyes, and full lips, he had many distinct physical characteristics that Kelley could have used, unconsciously or not, to assign himself a position of power over Varela. Moreover, because the public image of Latinos is still one of “an immigrant, a recent arrival,” or a racial Other to the dominant Anglo culture, Kelley may have believed his actions were justified to the extent that he was following the dominant Anglo cultural tradition of excluding those individuals who are deemed to be members of a separate and inferior race.

At the same time, Varela's murder must also be filtered through a nativist lens. As the reader will recall, nativism focuses on the “foreign” and “un-American” characteristics of an individual or group that promotes the elimination of those who are unable to assimilate fully into the dominant culture. In short, nativism translates “into a zeal [by the dominant society] to destroy the [foreign] enemies of a distinctively American way of life.” Varela, a man with 200 family members who lived in Phoenix, Arizona, at the time of his death, and a person who spoke Spanish, could certainly have been perceived to embody the trigger for Kelley's fear of foreigners.

According to the news reports, at the time of his arrest, Kelley was an “unemployed golf-cart repairman and greens supervisor.” He had no known family and presumably lived alone in a racially-mixed, low-income neighborhood. Alone and a residential “minority” in a charged environment of political hostility toward immigrants, Kelley's internalized and irrational fear made Varela an easy target. Not surprisingly, nativism becomes particularly pervasive in times of “national stress and fear, as in times of war, economic recession, or demographic shifts stemming from unwanted immigration[,] ” all of which are still prevalent and were particularly pronounced at the time of Varela's murder in 2010.

Like the public's paranoid fear of L.A.'s Mexican youth in the 1940s, itself a product of the country's pathological fear of a foreign takeover as it entered into the Second World War, Kelley saw Varela, like the 1940s Mexican hoodlums, as an internal foreigner whose cultural and linguistic traits represented a disloyalty to the dominant culture's concept of national unity. Thus, it is likely that Varela's murder was a result of Kelley's nativist beliefs about him.

However, the murder of Varela should also be examined through a racialized nativist lens. As a Mexican-American and a third-generation U.S. citizen, Varela might also have symbolized to Kelley the foreigner of color whose cultural traits prevented him full assimilation into the dominant culture and whose race excluded him from full acceptance by the dominant culture. For Kelley, Varela might have represented a foreigner who shared the same separate and inferior physical characteristics as the “imbecile and indolent” Mexican race. In Kelley's mind, Varela could have embodied the dirty, lazy race that drained public resources, took all the jobs, and contributed to the high rates of crime. All told, Varela perhaps signified to Kelley an American future in which cultural and racial diversity would “be among its defining features.” If Kelley believed that Varela's continued presence brought closer the dreaded day when diversity would triumph and blur the distinctions among the external foreigner, the internal foreigner of color, and the nationalist, then killing him might have made Kelley feel less fearful.

On the other hand, considering that Varela's murder occurred Arizona, the same state in which SB 1070 had been enacted just two weeks earlier, meaningful connections must also be drawn between the draconian anti-immigration mandates of the politicians and the negative effects of such directives on some citizens. Like the Alien Registration Act of 1940 and other comparable anti-immigration legislation, the enactment of SB 1070 authorized the limitation, reduction, or elimination of a particular immigrant group within the United States. SB 1070 was also enacted by decision-makers who feared such foreigners believing them to have a corrosive effect on the nation's security and identity.

Thus, Anglo citizens like Kelley are both encouraged and allowed to treat particular groups with hostility and disdain, if for no other reason than to maintain their own sense of national unity and security. At the same time, Anglos are bombarded with overheated rhetoric from state legislators suggesting that the way to control the immigration problem in the United States is to shoot immigrants in the same manner feral hogs are shot - by helicopter. Anglos are exposed daily to fear-filled rants that a weak stance on immigration will inevitably lead to “terror babies.” In such a climate, the connection between the murder of Varela and the broader political anti-immigrant sentiment emerges in stark relief.

Whether Kelley held racist or nativist beliefs that were validated by Arizona's SB 1070 law and whether those beliefs prompted his murdering of Varela are matters for debate. However, in the view of many Anglos, Latinos indisputably are the ethnic group that has embodied the image of the “alien” who does “not really belong to, or in, America.” As some scholars argue, “the public identification of ‘illegal aliens' with person[s] of Mexican ancestry is so strong that many Mexican Americans and other Latino citizens are presumed foreign and illegal. When citizens and aliens look alike, then all are presumed to be alien and foreign and undermining of the national character.”

Finally, it may be that Kelley felt free to murder Varela because he viewed him as a racially/ethnically unknowable and indefinable individual. Working within the black and white binary analysis, the racial construction of Mexican-Americans, and the resulting normalization of racial ambiguity of Latinos, prominently began in litigation. For example, in Hernandez v. Texas, although the Supreme Court held that Latinos were permitted to sue for discrimination in parts of the country where they could show local prejudice, it failed to recognize Latinos, as a group, as a separate race.

Throughout our history differences in race and color have defined easily identifiable groups which have at times required the aid of the courts in securing equal treatment under the laws. But community prejudices are not static, and from time to time other differences from the community norm may define other groups which need the same protection. Whether such a group exists within a community is a question of fact.

Similarly, in Tijerina v. Henry, New Mexico's District Court refused to allow Mexican Americans to define themselves as a separate class of “Mexican-Americans” who sought equal educational opportunities in local schools. As the court put it in its dismissal of the complaint, the term “Mexican-American” was too indistinct to be defined a class within the meaning of class action suits under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Alternatively, various lower federal and state courts have treated Mexicans as non-white. For example, in Inland Steel Co. v. Barcelona, the Indiana Appellate Court held that, as a legal classification of an inhabitant and citizen of the United States, “the word ‘Mexican’ should [not] necessarily be construed to be a white person” when the Encyclopedia Britannica states, “that approximately one-fifth of the inhabitants of Mexico are whites, approximately two-fifths Indians, and the balance made up of mixed bloods, Negroes, Japanese, and Chinese.” Similarly, in In re Camille, the Circuit Court of the District of Oregon that a man who “is as much an Indian as a white person” is not a white person under the naturalization laws because the words “white person” did not intend to include “the red race of America.”

In contrast, in Independent School District v. Salvatierra, the Texas Appellate Court held that Mexican school children could not be segregated from “children of other white races, merely or solely because they are Mexicans.” Accordingly, Mexican-Americans were seen as white by various lower courts.

As exemplified by the cases above, the racial construction of Mexican-Americans by the courts--as either white, not white, or of no racial identity at all--was a consequence of viewing Mexican-Americans within the paradigm of the black and white binary. As a result, the racial classification of Mexican-Americans lacked meaning and resolve. In fact, where the Anglo judges ruled that Mexicans were either white or non-white, it was often based on the need to “reformulate[] their white selves” and protect Anglo privilege. Although Mexicans were “co-whites” by law, they were never given the same degree of privilege and protection as their white compatriots. Thus, as non-racial equals, Mexicans, by law, were left with no racial classification at all. Accordingly, the categorization of Mexicans remained racially ambiguous.

Although Varela was a Mexican-American with brown skin, he was categorically racially ambiguous, and therefore, insignificant within the commonly accepted black/white paradigm. Thus, perhaps, the act of murdering Varela was not merely a product of Kelley's racist or nativist beliefs towards Varela, but was also fueled by his hatred and irrational fear of Varela's vague, shifting, and racially ambiguous identity - one that could easily stem directly from the various cases that failed to classify Latinos as a legitimized race.


IV. Authoritarianism and Anti-Latino Violence

‘My message to them is, not in two weeks, not in two months, not in two years, never! We must be clear that we will not surrender America and we will not turn the United States over to the invaders from south of the border[[.] ‘

“Invaders, that's what they are. Invaders on the American sovereignty and it cant [sic] be tolerated.”

The authoritarian lens provides a contextual view that draws together the separate lenses of racism, nativism, and the black/white binary to examine violence against Latinos in a deeper and more nuanced manner. It is essential to view such violence through the broader scope of authoritarianism because it examines the personal pathology of the abuser in addition to the cultural influences. Many, if not all, of the theories seeking to explain the continued mistreatment of Latinos have proceeded on the basis of either racism or nativism alone. For example, various scholars have argued that anti-immigrant sentiments are strictly “focus[ed] on racism [in] the absence of nativism . . . [which] reflects a historical amnesia of the recurring patterns of nativism across previous eras of anti-immigrant sentiment in the history of the US.” Thus, in supporting a theory that attempts to unify all posited theories related to the violence against Latinos, it is imperative that the theory not cloud or eliminate the socio-historical landscape in which the contemporary acts of violence against Latinos took root. Indeed, convincing connections should be made between the motivations behind the murder of Varela by Kelley in 2010 and the lynching of Jesús Romo by Anglo settlers in 1874 or that of the Sleepy Lagoon murder. While more than one theory may be necessary to explain the intricate motives behind violence against Latinos, the authoritarian theory focuses on personal pathology as a way to explain the origins of an individual's prejudice towards certain groups. The theory is, in that sense, eclectic - it intermingles with the individual's other beliefs, including racism, nativism, and the general fear of the Other.

Authoritarianism is the over-arching frame and lens for seeing Latinos and the impact of racism, nativism, and the black/white binary. Whether on a conscious or unconscious level, we all have been shaped by authoritarian upbringing and practices, which ingrained in us a need for authority, as well as a belief that punishment is in order for those who defy authority. For some, the need for authority may have stemmed from their relationship as the obedient child to their authoritarian parent. For others, the need for authority may have arisen from the drive to find stability in an otherwise disorganized world. For example, during times of economic recession, loss of employment, divorce, or death of a family member, authoritarianism, as an expression of traditionalist ideals or values can provide us with a sense of predictability and order in an environment that has become uncontrollable. It may be when we feel threatened or uncertain that we seek authority and become vulnerable to authoritarianism. And yet for all, “authority may simply fulfill the function of other needs[,] ” and not itself be the need which needs fulfilling.

At the apex of the Holocaust, social scientists sought answers to explain the success of German fascism, in addition to anti-Semitism and social discrimination. The work hypothesized “a personality profile--that is, relatively stable and pervasive characteristics and tendencies that form a coherent pattern--of ‘the potentially fascistic individual, one whose structure is such as to render him particularly susceptible to anti-democratic propaganda.”’ Thus, there emerges the authoritarian personality (TAP) that is obedient to authority because it developed from a “weak and dependent individual who has sacrificed his [sic] capacity for genuine experience of self and others in order to maintain . . . order and safety[[,] ” but nevertheless took authority to repress, punish, and oppress human beings who did not follow his own order-based reality.

For authoritarians, obedience “provided permanence, stability, and certainty.” In the United States, authoritarian movements were connected to traditional moralism, defense of the status quo, belief in the necessity of maintaining order, and hostility toward new ideas. In turn, authoritarians, as obeyers of rules, do “not hold independent judgments about the goodness or value of [the] rules. Obeyers simply believe that any challenge to rules is deeply threatening . . . .” Authoritarians are “rigid, inflexible[,] and intolerant of difference . . . . [and] ambiguity, [[and] . . . . likely to be prejudiced against racial, religious, and ethnic” groups who are not members of their own authoritarian group. Typically, authoritarian individuals have difficulty dealing with their own deviant impulses, such as aggression, fear, weakness, and sex within the constraints of social relations. Thus, ill equipped to confront such feelings directly, authoritarians displace their unacceptable urges onto others, particularly members of disempowered groups, and attribute to others what is so intolerable to themselves.

While authoritarian personalities can be extreme or mild, several core attributes of authoritarianism have remained constant and proven useful in understanding the social science behind prejudice. First, authoritarians need groups other than their own to maintain a sense of self. “Having failed to develop internally a consistent . . . set of values, [[] authoritarian[s] gravitate[] toward[s] external sources of behavioral control, simultaneously both craving the comfort of externalized responsibility and resenting the resulting stultification of identity and inhibition of impulses.” Thus, Kelley, unable to accept his own feelings of fear and anger, whether due to his joblessness, loneliness, or helplessness, turned his hostility outward. Varela became the target of Kelley's internal conflicts; Varela became the representation of those hostilities. This provided the ideological construct from which Kelley developed his hierarchal relationship with Varela. Varela embodied the negative feelings, ideas, and images Kelley sought to repress, which to Kelley became the basis for his hostile action toward Varela. Therefore, Varela represented the opposite of everything Kelley believed he was: clean, conventional, well-mannered, and disciplined. By degrading Varela, Kelley demonstrated his inability to distinguish between the good and bad characteristics of an individual such as Varela.

Second, authoritarian personalities need groups other than their own to be the vehicles by which they assert dominance. Thus, authoritarians are more prone to seek groups of lower social status. Their victims tend to adhere less to Anglo-sanctioned and defined convention and conventional values, and therefore, are more likely to be considered to violate the (Anglo-made and monitored) rules. As suggested by one writer, authoritarians see human relationships in terms of “justified applications of power[,] ” where, in a just world, the Other only “frustrates the processes of justice and fair play[.] ” Thus, authoritarians are “justified in resorting to facially unjust measures[] ” in order to make the world just again. In turn, authoritarians have greater opportunity to control those victims who are deemed to have demonstrated their unruly behavior and feel justified to destroy those victims “to prevent them from destroying” the authoritarian. While Kelley and Varela were likely similar in terms of class, they were dissimilar racially. They were also dissimilar in their experiences with social prejudices and bigotry that stemmed from their racial difference. Certainly, Varela was of a racial group that, in Kelley's eyes, represented a threat to Anglo convention. Moreover, where authoritarians tend to only “associate [themselves] with the ‘right kind of people[,] ”’ including individuals who are of an “‘accepted’ . . . social status,” Varela had little hope of becoming a real choice of friend to Kelley. Like other perceived foreigners who do not share the same physical features and cultural traits as the Anglo nativists, Varela emerged as a destructive force for the Anglo national identity in Kelley's view. In turn, Kelley believed it was his duty to rectify the destructiveness that Varela represented for him by murdering Varela.

Third, authoritarian personalities are close-minded. Because authoritarians view the outside world as disorderly and threatening, they have a close-minded belief system that resists change if it is not specifically tied to or endorsed by authority. Kelley may have found Varela intolerable because he represented the opposite of everything Kelley believed he was, and therefore, he was impervious to seeing Varela as a human being. In addition, Kelley could have been easily persuaded by Anglo nativist social influence, if such influence was commanded by a person with authority and power. Kelley more than likely was exposed to such anti-Latino sentiments as: ‘Mexican men have a reputation for leering and worse at little girls, which shouldn't surprise us, since sex with children is socially acceptable in Mexico.‘ When this type of rant was publicized and publicly espoused by state legislators, Kelley may have sought to submit himself to such authoritative demands and, thereby, to provide himself with a moral justification to murder Varela--a perceived and singled-out threat to national unity simply because he was perceived morally weak and culturally inferior.

Authoritarianism provides a relevant, unifying, and corollary insight to the theories of racism, nativism and the black/white binary that leads to Latinos' racial ambiguity. This insight is useful in explaining the motives behind violence against Latinos. Without the addition of authoritarian theory and application, the analysis of the Varela murder, the Sleepy Lagoon trial, and the Zoot Suit Riots can easily disappear from public memory because they do not fit neatly into the traditional black/white binary that dominates legal discourse.


V. Conclusion

On February 9, 2011, Judge Susan Brnovich declared a mistrial in the case against Kelley when the jury failed to reach a verdict. Although it is uncertain how many jurors were not convinced of Kelley's guilt and why, the facts show that the jurors who heard and deliberated the case were all white.

The murder of Varela can be attributed to a variety of causes: the anxiety and fulfillment that Kelley may have felt based on the mandates and outcries made by public officials who advocated fear and intolerance towards immigrants; the racist and nativist beliefs that Kelley probably held against Varela as a perceived foreigner in this country; and the entitlement Kelley may have believed he had to murder Varela because of the ambiguity that continues to surround the racial/ethnic classification of Latinos. Separately, each of these rationales is plausible in explaining Kelley's motive to murder his innocent, Mexican-American neighbor. Yet, as separate and distinct rationales, their ability to explain the murder of Varela suffers. Therefore, a framework - the authoritarian perspective - in which all three theories of racism, nativism, and the black/white binary combine and work together helps us to understand events such as Varela's murder.

This overlapping theoretical approach allows us to see that Latinos are the victims of a society that permits them to be erased by minimizing the impact of racism, nativism, and the black/white binary that, most of the time, we prefer to ignore. Without a deeper and more nuanced examination of the treatment of Latinos by the dominant society, the Latino community will continue to suffer erasure. Latinos will remain nowhere in sight.

 


 

. B.A., University of California, Riverside (2008); Seattle University School of Law, J.D. expected 2012.

White Supremacy and Mexican Americans

Joe R. Feagin

excerpted from: Mexican Americans: Rethinking the "Black-white Paradigm", 54 Rutgers Law Review 959-987, 957-965 (Summer 2002) (154 Footnotes Omitted)


In May 1990, three white men in suburban San Diego were drinking beer. After a while, one said he wanted to "shoot some aliens." From a house on the United States-Mexico border, one man, using a high-powered rifle, shot and killed a twelve-year-old Mexican youngster attempting to cross the border. The man was sentenced only to two years in jail for involuntary manslaughter. Clearly, this killer did not value the lives of undocumented immigrants. In recent years, white hostility toward immigrants has sometimes reached violent, even hysterical levels, as evidenced by numerous white supremacist publications. These publications attack Latinos, African Americans, Native Americans, and Asian Americans, who are often called "mud" peoples, racial "mongrels," and "aliens." Yet it is not just ordinary Americans, but powerful whites as well, who create the negative image of "aliens" invading the country. For example, we see in the San Diego case that the United States judge did not place much value on a Mexican immigrant's life.

But who, actually, are the real aliens? One of the great ironies of this killing is that the Mexican youngster and other so-called "aliens" crossing the border are moving into what was once part of northern Mexico, an area taken by force by the United States government. Indeed, a research study by Robert Alvarez found that for nearly two centuries, starting well before the United States took control from Mexico in an imperialistic war in the 1840's, many generations of Mexicans migrated back and forth from Mexico's Baja California to what is now the United States' political entity called California. Thus, there is a long history of Mexicans moving over this land area, and it is only later in that movement's history that a border was imposed.

The fact that most white Americans do not know, or prefer to forget, their brutal and imperialistic history makes it easier to rationalize attacks on Mexican immigrants. In April 1846, President James Polk, seeking to gain "[a]ll Mexico," sent United States troops into an area, Texas, recently taken by force from Mexico, and then, on into an area of the borderlands that he knew Mexicans had long viewed and treated as their sovereign territory. President Polk intentionally provoked a border clash between the United States and Mexican troops, an incident that enabled him to falsely claim that Mexico had started a war against the United States. Later historians have linked this trumped-up war to the imperialist and racist notion that the United States had a right to move into Mexican territory as part of its "manifest destiny" to rule over "backward" peoples. This imperialist notion rationalized the desire of many European American invaders for unjust enrichment in the form of land. Indeed, the border area where the first skirmish took place soon became the home for very large and profitable Anglo cattle ranches.

It was in 1845 that jingoistic journalist John O'Sullivan coined the phrase "manifest destiny" when he wrote that "[o]ur manifest destiny is to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions." Together with many other European Americans, O'Sullivan argued that the United States government had a mandate to teach the North American way of life to "backward" peoples such as Mexicans and Native Americans.

However, during and after the Mexican-American war, as the debates over the incorporation of Mexican territory increased, some white southerners were concerned that too many of these mixed-race people might be brought into the United States. During congressional debates over annexing Mexican territory, prominent Senator John C. Calhoun argued that the United States had never "incorporated into the Union any but the Caucasian race. . . . Ours is a government of the white man. . . . in the whole history of man . . . there is no instance whatever of any civilized colored race, of any shade, being found equal to the establishment and maintenance of free government." In his view, as well as that of other whites, the "colored and mixed-breed" Mexicans were unacceptable in the "free" United States. I note here that the irony of this argument, an argument still asserted today, involves how the mix in the Latin American population was created. As Mexican American analyst Ilan Stavans bluntly wrote, "In one way or another, we are all children of lascivious Iberians and raped Indian and African maidens, and yet, diversity is our flag: We are blacks, Spaniards, Indians, mulattos, and mestizos."

If it had not been for the imperialistic war-making on the part of the United States government, the Mexican youngster who was killed in 1990, as well as many other immigrants, might well have been traveling peacefully from one part of Mexico to another. In a real sense, the boy was not the "alien." It is the European Americans who today are "aliens." They are the descendants of invading "aliens" who took over northern Mexico by force. This era of United States imperialism is still rarely dealt with in the country's schools and textbooks.

Typically, the conception of a group of human beings as somehow "alien," as an inferior "race," is substantially generated and maintained by those with great power and authority. Throughout United States history, ordinary white Americans have usually learned their stereotyped views of the racialized "other" from those in authority, including parents, politicians, teachers, clergy, business leaders, and media authorities. Note, for example, the influential book, Alien Nation, by Peter Brimelow, an editor for Forbes business magazine. In his book, Brimelow develops a negative view of recent immigrants to the United States and emphasizes the notion that they are not European, but are indeed "alien." Like many business, political, and religious leaders, he is particularly concerned about Latin American immigrants. He even suggests there is a "glaring possibility" that Mexican immigration to the Southwest may eventually lead to a restoration of the area to Mexico. He worries that there are Mexican American organizations "openly working for Aztlan, a Hispanic-dominated 'political' unit to be carved out of the Southwest and (presumably) reunited with Mexico." As Brimelow sees it, "the American nation has always had a specific ethnic core. And that core has been white." Before 1950, he argues, most Americans "looked like [him]. That is, they were of European stock. And in those days, they had another name for this thing dismissed so contemptuously as 'the racial hegemony of white Americans.' They called it 'America."' Clearly, Brimelow's concern is with protecting white dominance, which he views as threatened by non-white "alien" peoples. The leading Latino scholar, Rodolfo Acu, has noted, "Always defined as Euroamerican, the US self-image seems to white people to be seriously threatened for the first time since the birth of the nation . . . . [This is] another reason for the virulence of today's racist nativism."

The influential Harvard professor Samuel Huntington has argued that, if multiculturalism ever becomes central in the United States, the nation could "join the Soviet Union on the ash heap of history." According to Huntington, in the past, nativist worries about immigrants' assimilating were unwarranted. Today, however, the situation is one where some immigrant

groups feel discriminated against if they are not allowed to remain apart from the mainstream. The ideologies of multiculturalism and diversity reinforce and legitimate these trends. They deny the existence of a common culture in the United States, denounce assimilation, and promote the primacy of racial, ethnic, and other subnational cultural identities and groupings. They also question a central element in the American Creed by substituting for the rights of individuals the rights of groups, defined largely in terms of race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual preference. Huntington makes clear in his analysis that he is explicitly concerned that today the immigrants come "overwhelmingly from Latin America and Asia." However, he does not deal with the substantial discrimination and segregation that these Latin American and Asian immigrants receive at the hands of white Americans - actions that doubtlessly reduce the possibility of integration and assimilation.

Influential commentators like business magazine editors and leading Ivy League professors play an important role in creating and circulating negative images of recent immigrants. The immigrants of greatest concern are usually those from Latin America. Moreover, conservative members of the nation's elite are not alone in creating images of threatening aliens who cannot, or do not want to, assimilate to the Anglo-Protestant mainstream. Even a liberal academic like the prominent historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has expressed fears that the United States cannot continue to permit substantial immigration if the new immigrants do not fully assimilate to "the language, the institutions, and the political ideals that hold the nation together." He too has in mind non-European immigrants from Latin America and Asia - those he fears are less oriented to Anglo-American ideas and institutions than those from Europe.

Those non-Latinos who edit and report in major newspapers and magazines play a primary role in communicating negative images of immigrants. For example, one recent study examined many articles in a major West Coast newspaper and discovered numerous reports on Latin American immigrants that used racialized language and metaphors. In these articles, reporters often used metaphors portraying Mexican and other Latin American immigrants as animals, invaders, and disreputable persons. The articles describe the need to "ferret out illegal immigrants," of government programs being "a lure to immigrants," of the appetite for "the red meat of deportation," and of government agents catching "a third of their quarry." Other terms and metaphors portrayed these immigrants as a danger, a burden, dirt, disease, invasion, or waves flooding the nation.

Significantly, the media figures who craft such images of an alien people flooding and threatening the nation are not members of the working class. They are for the most part middle- and upper middle-class white Americans. Working class and lower middle class whites often absorb, or extend, such negative metaphors of the immigrants coming into the country. Thus, on numerous Internet websites, as well as in videos and books, white supremacists describe Mexican and other Latino immigrants as a "cultural cancer" or a "wildfire." They too are sometimes concerned that Mexicans have a plan to reconquer the United States.

The role of middle- and upper middle-class whites in circulating negative images of Mexican immigrants, other Mexican Americans, and other Latinos can be seen in the commonplace mocking of Spanish and Latino cultures. One research study by leading anthropologist Jane Hill examined the common caricaturing and mocking of the Spanish language across the nation - including made-up terms such as "hasta la vista, baby" and "no problemo," and phrases such as "numero uno" and "no way, Jos" While this mocking may seem innocuous to some white observers, it reveals "a highly negative image of the Spanish language, its speakers, and the culture and institutions associated with them." Complex caricaturing of Spanish and Spanish speakers is commonplace in board rooms, at country-club gatherings, in gift shops, and in the mass media, where once again, the purveyors are typically middle- and upper-class whites. Moreover, advertising signs and cards in gift shops and similar stores sometimes contain jokes about "cucarachas," the Spanish word for cockroaches and an epithet sometimes used by whites to describe Mexicans.

Degrading images are also found in places where they have more subtle effects. For example, in a recent movie, Men in Black, a United States government organization is trying to keep "aliens" from going to other planets. In the movie, the most threatening aliens are cockroaches, who are successfully exterminated by the movie's heroes. Since the movie begins with images of Mexican immigrants, this scenario likely reinforces in moviegoers' minds the association of cockroaches with "alien immigrants."

With the large increase in Latin American immigrants and the Latino population in recent decades, an era where blatantly racist comments are considered impolite by most people in public settings, has come a more subtle way of stereotyping and deriding these new Americans. Such linguistic and cultural mocking often generates or perpetuates degrading stereotypes and images of Latinos.

[1]. Graduate Research Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Florida, Box 117330, Gainesville, FL 32611.

Where We've Been: Legal Constructs, and Consequences, of Race in America and the Historical Racialization of American Muslim Identity

Amara S. Chaudhry-Kravitz

Excerpted from:  Amara S. Chaudhry-Kravitz, Is Brown the New Black?: American Muslims, Inherent Propensity for Violence, and America's Racial History, 20 Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice 3 (Fall, 2013)(66 Footnotes)


Amara Chaudhry-Kravitz-02* * * [My thesis is simple. I assert that the criminalization of American Muslim group identity is a by-product of two things: (1) the historical racialization of that identity as a "non-white" racial category, and (2) the presumption, throughout American history, that "non-white" persons have an inherent propensity for violence and criminality.

* * *

Before I delve too deeply into the substance of my remarks, I want to take a moment to define my terms.

Throughout my remarks, I will use the phrase "American Muslim." When I use this term, I am referring to persons living in the United States who either self-identify as "Muslim," or who are identified by others as "Muslim" regardless of whether the basis of that identity lies in internal religious beliefs, externally articulated religious beliefs, and/or externally *6 expressed religious practices. The term "Muslim" shall apply to any such identified persons regardless of race, ethnicity, national origin, or country of familial origin. The term also applies irrespective of an individual's country of citizenship, whether a person is an immigrant or American born, and regardless of the duration of the individual's, or the individual's family's, history in the United States.

When I speak about "criminalization," I'm speaking about explicit, implicit, or even unconscious use of Muslim identity as either an ex ante basis for predicting an individual's propensity for violence or likelihood to engage in criminal behavior in the future, or as an ex post facto basis for determining the likelihood that an individual has engaged in violence and/or criminal behavior in the past or present.

*7 When I speak of the "racialization," I am referring to the extent to which American Muslim identity is construed, and has been historically construed, as a racial category. As I describe below in Part III, below, I believe that it is undisputed that American Muslims have a socially constructed group identity, and this group identity has been criminalized. The question, which is examined by this article, is whether that socially constructed group identity is, and should be understood as, a racial identity. In answering this question, I will argue that American Muslim should be construed as a racial identity, I will describe how Muslim identity has been socially constructed as a "non-white" racial identity in a nation which has a long history of assuming that persons who belong to populations consisting mostly of individuals with black or brown skin have a higher propensity for violence and criminality. Therefore, considering American Muslim identity in the context of American racial history and the historical *8 criminalization of non-white racial identity, I argue that American Muslims have been criminalized on the basis of their group identity precisely because their group identity has been racialized as a "non-white" racial identity.

In order to understand the concept I label as "racialization," it is necessary to distinguish between anti-Muslim bias (specifically, the criminalization of American Muslim identity), which is, in effect, a racialized bias, and anti-Muslim bias, which is a religious bias. When I refer to a racialized bias, I refer to a belief (possibly, unstated or even unconscious) that American Muslims have an inherent propensity for violence as an intrinsic and organic part of their very being. This propensity is inborn, immutable, and cannot be removed by converting to another religious faith or otherwise altering one's religious beliefs or practices. This racialized bias against American Muslims should be understood to be separate and distinct from a belief (which, again, may be unstated or even unconscious) that Muslims' belief system encourages violence and that a Muslim can be "cured," as it were, from his propensity for violence by converting to another faith or otherwise altering his religious beliefs. As one scholar phrases it, "In a religious conflict, it is not who you are but what you believe that is important. Under a racist regime, there is no escape from who you areor are perceived to be."

* * *

So we know that this is where we are now: American Muslims have been "criminalized," and it appears as though the underlying predicate of that criminalization rests both in some sort of socially constructed "racialized" American Muslim group identity and on the basis of wholly mutable characteristics such as individualized beliefs and behavior.

Now, I want to step back a minute to discuss "Where We've Been." If, as I suggest, the criminalization of American Muslim identity post-9/11 is based, at least to some extent, upon socially constructed notions of *15 "race," then there are new questions to discuss. First, can a religious identity be "racialized," or are racial and religious identities two separate social constructs? Second, if religious identity can be "racialized," what is the evidence that American Muslim identity has been "racialized?"

I will answer these questions concurrently, beginning with cases that demonstrate that American Muslim identity, a seemingly religious identity, has been historically construed as a non-white racial identity as a matter of law. The very existence of this body of case law, and the language contained therein, is evidence that a religious identity can be "racialized" and, by way of an example, that Muslim religious identity has been so racialized.

The greatest evidence of this racialization of American Muslims as "non-white" is contained in cases which are known as the "racial prerequisite cases." These are cases that were decided during the time period beginning in 1790 and ending in 1952 in which the Naturalization Act limited American citizenship to what was called "free white persons," but without defining exactly who would be included in this particular racial category. The Act was later broadened in 1870 to include persons of "African nativity" and persons of "African descent" and again in 1940 to include "races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere." During this time period, any persons who immigrated to the United States who did not qualify as either a "free white person," a person belonging to a race "indigenous to the Western Hemisphere," or a person of "African nativity" or "African descent" could lawfully enter the United States but could not be naturalized as a citizen of the United States. In the racial prerequisite *16 cases, an immigrant filed an application for citizenship and a federal court, when considering whether to grant that decision, was faced with the question of deciding whether the immigrant could lawfully claim to be "free white persons" and, therefore, eligible to become a citizen under the Naturalization Act.

Specifically, I want to discuss some racial prerequisite cases, which involve petitioners from the Muslim-majority world, or other nations within the Greater Middle East. The purpose of this discussion is to demonstrate the extent to which religious identity or affiliation was historically used, in the context of the racial prerequisite cases, by federal courts to make a legal determination as to race.

The first case I want to talk about is In re Hassan, which arose out of the Eastern District of Michigan in 1942. In that case, a Yemeni Muslim man was petitioning a federal district court to be naturalized as a citizen of the United States. As he petitioned the court, Mr. Hassan employed a tactic which was common among petitioners in the racial prerequisite cases asserted that he was a member of the "white race" due to the fact that he belonged to an ethnic group which "are remote descendants of and therefore members of the Caucasian or white race. . . ." Mr. Hassan also seemed to assume that his physical appearance-which, as the court noted in its decision, included an "extremely dark complexion" pose an obstacle to his ability to claim to be a member of the "white" race because he came to court "armed with affidavits" stating that his coloring ‘is typical of the majority of Arabians [sic] from the region from which he *17 comes, which [in] fact is attributed to the intense heat and the blazing sun of that area."

The court ultimately rejected Mr. Hassan's assertion that he was a "free white person" and denied his petition for naturalization. However, the court did not base its denial upon either Mr. Hassan's stated ancestry (as a remote descendant of the Caucasian or white race) or upon his physical appearance (including the "extremely dark complexion"). Instead, the court denied Mr. Hassan's petition because he came from a region of the world where Islam was being practiced. The court specifically gave the following reason for its decision: "Apart from the dark-skin of the Arabs, it is well-known that they are a part of the Mohammedan [sic] world and that a wide gulf separates their culture from that of the predominately Christian peoples of Europe."

This language in Hassan raises several interesting points. First, and most obviously, the court uses Mr. Hassan's Muslim identity as a basis for defining his race as non-white. Second, the court indicates that "Christian" identity is necessary to be considered a "free white person" person eligible for citizenship. Third, and most intriguingly, the court seems to base its decision not on Mr. Hassan's individual religious identity, but upon the majority religion in the region of the world from which Mr. Hassan emigrated. This is an example of the racialization of Muslim identity-the notion that this particular religious identity applies to all persons who possess the same set of immutable characteristics, such as a shared ethnicity, regardless of any individual's particular religious beliefs. Indeed, the court's language fails to identify whether Mr. Hassan, as an individual, identifies as "Muslim" or practices the Islamic faith. Instead, the court only identifies Mr. Hassan as belonging to an ethnic group, "Arab," which is associated with the Muslim-majority world. Mr. Hassan is deemed non-white because his ethnicity, an immutable characteristic, imparts upon him a Muslim identity. Based upon this language, it would appear that the *18 judge construed Muslim identity in such a racialized manner that the religious beliefs and practices of Mr. Hassan were legally irrelevant.

This question of whether a person's individual religious beliefs affect his racial identity is commonly repeated in the racial prerequisite cases and produce conflicting results. In the case of In re Ellis, a Syrian immigrant was allowed to obtain citizenship as a free white person because, as the court noted, "he was reared a Catholic and is still of that faith." In another case involving a Syrian immigrant, Ex parte Shahid, the court denies the petitioner's citizenship application on grounds other than the petitioner's race, but articulates his discomfort with the notion that the definition of "free white persons" should exclude a consideration of religious identity. Limiting the definition of "free white persons" solely to "Europeans," the judge explained, that it would be troubling since such a definition "would exclude persons coming from the very cradle of the Jewish and Christian religions." Though the judge in Shahid never clarified whether he believed that an individual's religious beliefs or practices, or whether the relevant factor was the predominate religion in a petitioner's country of origin, the judge nonetheless clearly opines that religion should be a consideration when legally defining an individual's race.

More interesting generally are the cases involving Armenian immigrants during this time period. For example, in United States v. Cartozian, a federal district court in Oregon granted an Armenian immigrant's citizenship petition on the stated belief that Armenians, on account of their religion, could be defined as free white persons eligible for citizenship. Specifically, the court opined, "[a]lthough the Armenian province is within the confines of the Turkish empire, being in Asia Minor, the people thereof have always held themselves aloof from the Turks, the Kurds, and allied peoples, principally, it might be said, on account of their *19 religion." In other words, Christianity makes the Armenians more culturally aligned with Europeans and this religious commonality makes the Armenians "white." In another naturalization case involving an Armenian petition, In re Halladjian, a federal district court sitting in Massachusetts opined:

"Race . . . is not an easy working test of white color. In the warfare which has raged since the beginning of history about the eastern Mediterranean between Europeans and Asiatics, the Armenians have generally. . . been found on the European side. By reason of their Christianity, they generally ranged themselves against the Persian fire-worshippers, and against the Mohammedans."

As in Cartozian, the court in Halladijan once again concluded that Armenians, due to the historic Christianity of their nation, are culturally aligned with Europeans and, therefore, their collective historic Christianity makes them, as a people, "white." Once again, the court is unclear whether an individual's religious identity is legally relevant but, once again, the court clearly articulates a racialized view that the historical majority religion of a people determines that group's racial identity.

This racialization of a religious identity is not unique to Muslims or to the United States. Consider, for example, the discourse and dialogue that surrounds Jewish identity and the definition thereof. Or, perhaps more appropriately, consider the way in which non-Jews have defined Jewish identity during certain periods of history. Above, I referenced two interesting points raised by the first case I discuss in this subpart, In re Hassan. However, the third point raised by the Hassan decision is, perhaps, the most intriguing. The Hassan decision was entered in 1942. Now, let us think about what was happening in world history in 1942 and whether there was any other part of the world, outside of the United States, in which a federal government was determining "whiteness" (or inclusion in the "Aryan," "European," or "Caucasian" race) on the basis of religion? Right? Now, keeping this concept of world history in mind, let's actually think about the Third Reich for a moment. Remember that Jewish identity was often determined by ancestry. If you were born a Jew you were a Jew. You could try to convert your way out of it, you were still a Jew. As noted by one scholar, "anti-Semitism became racism when the belief took hold that Jews were intrinsically and organically evil rather than merely having *20 false beliefs and wrong dispositions." In other words, religious bias predicated upon actual or perceived religious beliefs and practices is not racism, as a person is able avoid this bias by changing their religious beliefs and practices. However, "religious" bias which relies upon a (stated, unstated, or even unconscious) belief that persons belonging to a certain religious group are "intrinsically and organically evil"-regardless of their religious beliefs or practices-is racism, and an individual cannot avoid this bias by converting to a different religion.

 


 

The title of this article, borrowed from the world of women's fashion, may at first seem to trivialize a complex, multi-faceted topic of sociological, legal, and political significance. The author chose this title for stylistic reasons-though her thesis would arguably have been more effectively articulated if the title was: "Is ‘Brown' Actually a New Shade of ‘Black'?" To clarify the use of color words in the title, the term "brown" is a short-hand expression commonly used by Muslims of varied racial and ethnic backgrounds and divergent physical characteristics when referring to the equally diverse and pluralistic American Muslim community. The term "black" in the title is a shorthand expression frequently used by Americans of culturally diverse backgrounds to refer to African Americans. In using this term, the author is fully aware that African Americans occupy a unique position in American society as a result of a very particular cultural history and a shared contemporary experience of the present-day legacy of that history. As stated below, the author's thesis rests upon her assertion that America's racial history is largely dependent upon a socially constructed white/non-white binary in which persons defined as "non-white" are presumed to have an inherent propensity for violence. The author's choice of tile derives from the fact that the primary example of this racial binary in American culture, and the presumptions of violence which apply thereto, in the United States is the black/white binary. Though "brown" may not be "the new black," the author asserts that "brown" is certainly a shade of "non-white" and that it would be helpful for American society to dialogue about the similarities and differences between these distinctions.

This article asserts that American Muslims are perceived as having an inherent propensity for violence and theorizes that this perception is related to an American racial history, which has a long history of perceiving "non-white" persons in this manner. It is this perceived inherent propensity for violence that is referenced in the title for this article, though the word "perceived" has been omitted for stylistic reasons.


 Amara Chaudhry-Kravitz currently serves as legal director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations Philadelphia Office (CAIR-Philadelphia).

 

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