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Slavery Federal Cases 1850 - 1865

1850

DCT

Campbell v. Kirkpatrick, 4 F.Cas. 1174, 5 McLean 175, No. 2363 (C.C.Ohio,1850)(The seventh section of the fugitive slave act of 1850, 9 Stat. 464, creates new offenses and penalties. Under the fugitive slave act of 1850, 9 Stat. 464, jurisdiction is given to the United States District Court both in criminal and civil prosecutions.
1850

DCT

Ex parte Garnet, 10 F.Cas. 6, 7 Leg.Int. 174, No. 5243 (C.C.Md.,1850)(In a proceeding under Act Sept. 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, title in an executor or legatee can be shown by oral evidence only by proof that he had the fugitive notoriously in his own possession as a slave; but where it is in proof that the fugitive escaped from the person under whom the executor or legatee claims, then the title of the latter can only be shown by the will, properly authenticated. Act Sept. 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, having provided a plain and easy method by which the claimant may perfect his proofs ex parte beforehand, if he fails to do so, and, after causing the fugitive to be arrested and brought before the court, is then unable to establish his title by proper evidence, the court will not grant him acontinuance, even until the next day, for the purpose of supplying his previous omissions, but will at once discharge the alleged fugitive from arrest. Proof of notorious ownership will be received by the claimants of fugitive slaves, and will not be limited to proof of ownership by paper title. Though Act Cong. Sept. 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, provided the method by which claimants for fugitive slaves should prove title, plaintiff may, on having neglected to establish title in the manner prescribed, prove the necessary matters of title, ownership, and escape in the court before which the fugitive is brought, according to the ordinary rules of evidence.)
1850

DCT

Jones v. VanZandt, 13 F.Cas. 1057, 5 McLean 214, 3 Ohio F.Dec. 12, No. 7505 (In an action to recover the value of runaway)(slaves, the acts mentioned in the declaration must be alleged to be contrary to Act 1793, 1 Stat. 302. In an action to recover the penalty given by Act 1793, 1 Stat. 302, concerning fugitives from labor, the acts mentioned in the declaration must be alleged to be contrary to the statute).
1850

DCT

Norris v. Newton, 18 F.Cas. 322, 5 McLean 92, 7 West.L.J. 515, No. 10,307 (C.C.Ind.,1850)(Under the constitution of the United States, the master has a right to seize his slave in any state where he may be found, if he can do so without a breach of the peace, and, without any exhibition of claim or authority, take him back to the state from which he absconded. If the master, in his return to habeas corpus, or in his proof, his return being denied, fail to show his right to the services of the fugitives, the state judge may discharge them from custody; but such discharge will not conclude the rights of the master, who may rearrest the fugitives, and by additional proof establish his right to their services, which he is bound to do if required by the state authorities.
1850

CirCt

Oliver v. Kauffman, 18 F.Cas. 657, 1 Am. Law Reg. 142, 9 Leg.Int. 152, No. 10,497 (C.C.E.D.Pa.,1850)(In an action on the case for harboring and concealing plaintiff's fugitive slaves, plaintiff must show that the slaves were lost to him by defendant's illegal interference, or that some other loss, injury, or damage was suffered by him in consequence thereof. ere acts of charity, however, as the giving food or lodging to a destitute apprentice or slave, are not made actionable where there is no such purpose or intent. The act contemplates not only an escape of a slave, but an intention on the part of the master to reclaim. Under Act February 12, 1793, 3, 1 Stat. 302, providing that, if any person shall harbor or conceal a fugitive from labor after notice that he or she is so, such person shall forfeit, etc., the word "notice" means knowledge, and "harboring" means entertaining or sheltering a fugitive with the purpose of encouraging him in his desertion of his master, with the purpose to further his escape, and to impede and frustrate the master's reclamation of him. "Harboring" is not here synonymous with "concealing," used in the same phrase with it, and there may be harboring without any concealment. Under Act Cong. February 12, 1793, providing that, "if any person shall harbor or conceal a fugitive from labor after notice that he or she is so, such person shall forfeit and pay $500, to be recovered by action of debt, saving moreover to the owner of such fugitive a right of action, on account of injuries," etc., "notice" means merely "knowledge," however obtained. The harboring of a fugitive from labor, made criminal by Act February 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 305, is the lending of encouragement to the fugitive, in his desertion of his master, to further his escape, and to impede and frustrate his reclamation, not mere acts of kindness and charity. The word "notice," as used in Act February 12, 1793, 4, 1 Stat. 305, making it an offense to harbor or conceal a person "after notice that he is a fugitive from labor," means "knowledge.")
1850

Sct

1850

Sct

1851

Sct

1851

DCT

Ex parte Davis, 7 F.Cas. 45, 9 West.L.J. 14, 14 Law Rep. 301, No. 3613 (N.D.N.Y.,1851)(The provisions of Fugitive Slave Act Sept. 18, 1850, 10, 9 Stat. 462, that "when any person held to labor or service, in any territory, or in the District of Columbia, shall escape therefrom, the party to whom such service or labor is due," etc., "may apply to any court of record therein, or judge thereof in vacation, and make satisfactory proof," etc., are clearly prospective, and inapplicable to the case of an escape occurring before the passage of the act. The provision of the fugitive slave act of Sept. 18, 1850, 6, 9 Stat. 462, that "the certificate of the commissioner shall be conclusive," etc., "and shall prevent all molestation," etc., "by any process issued by any court, judge, magistrate, or other person whatsoever," applies only to a certificate which appears on its face to be granted, or by a reasonable interpretation of its language might have been granted, in conformity with the act, and in pursuance of the authority thereby conferred, by a person having power to grant it, and proceeding in a manner warranted by the act An error in a certificate under the fugitive slave law of Sept. 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, by which it appears that the adjudication was made without evidence, may be corrected on habeas corpus.)
1851

Sct

1851

DCT

In re Charge to Grand Jury - Fugitive Slave Law, 30 F.Cas. 1007, 1 Blatchf. 635, No. 18,261 (C.C.N.Y.,1851)(The "judicial power" mentioned in the constitution and vested in the courts means the power conferred upon courts in the strict sense of that term-courts that compose one of the three great departments of the government; and not power judicial in its nature, or quasi judicial, invested from time to time in individuals, separately or collectively, for a particular purpose and limited time, and the provisions of Act Sept. 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, which confer on commissioners the power to act under it, and which provide for a summary hearing and decision, are not unconstitutional. The proceeding contemplated by the cause of the constitution in regard to the delivery of fugitives from service or labor is not a suit at common law, within the meaning of the seventh amendment to the constitution.)
1851

DCT

In re Long, 15 F.Cas. 821, 9 N.Y.Leg.Obs. 73, 3 Am. Law J. (N.S.) 294, 8 Leg.Int. 10, No. 8478 (S.D.N.Y.,1851)(The fugitive slave law of Sept. 16, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, is not unconstitutional).
1851

Sct

1852

Sct

1852

CirCt

U S v. Williams, 28 F.Cas. 631, 4 Am. Law J. (N.S.) 486, No. 16,705 (1852)(It is not necessary that the defendant should have been actually present at the act of "obstruction," etc., it is sufficient to render him liable as a principal that it was in pursuance of a common plan of himself and others. To "obstruct, hinder, or prevent" the claimant to recover his slave within the act, is knowingly and willfully to frustrate and retard the attempted recaption of a fugitive slave by his master, or his representative, by voice, active or passive, or by stratagem. The offense of "aiding, abetting, or assisting" a slave "to escape," in the second section of the act, applies only to an escape after recaption. The act of aiding a slave to escape from the domestic custody of his master is not an offense within the act of 1850, which applies only to cases where the slave has passed beyond the limits of the state under whose laws he was held. The offense of frustrating or retarding the attempted recapture of a fugitive slave being a misdemeanor, one aiding or abetting another to commit it, whether he be absent or present, is guilty as a principal. The fugitive slave law (section 7) makes it a criminal offense knowingly and willfully to frustrate or retard the attempted recapture of a fugitive slave by his master, whether it be by force, active or passive, or stratagem.)
1852

DCT

U. S. v. Rycraft, 27 F.Cas. 918, No. 16,211 (D.C.Wis.,1852)(On a prosecution for aiding in the escape of one arrested under lawful process as being a fugitive slave, it is not necessary to show that he actually was the slave of the person at whose instance the process was issued. The fact that the members of a vigilance committee, formed to prevent the execution of the fugitive slave law, stated that their object was to prevent the "kidnapping" of the fugitive by the officers of justice and the alleged owner, furnished strong evidence of their responsibility for a subsequent riot and rescue of the fugitive from the jail in which he was confined, even though they individually counseled peaceable measures.)
1852

DCT

U.S. v. Reed, 27 F.Cas. 727, 2 Blatchf. 435, 15 Law Rep. 428, No. 16,134 (C.C.N.Y.,1852)(When, under section 6 of the act of September 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 463, known as the "Fugitive Slave Act," a warrant is issued by competent authority, that is sufficient to justify the arrest and detention of the fugitive until he is discharged by due course of law, and any person concerned in rescuing or attempting to rescue such fugitive out of the custody of the law subjects himself to the penalties of the act.)
1853

Sct

1853

DCT

Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F.Cas. 335, 5 McLean 469, 10 West.L.J. 528, No. 9583 (C.C.Ohio,1853)(The judges of the supreme court of the United States, whose jurisdiction is coextensive with the country, are bound to take judicial notice of the existence of slavery in those states where it prevails. Slavery is a municipal regulation, and cannot exist without the authority of law; but it need not be shown that it is created by express enactment. It may arise from long-recognized rights countervened by no legislative action. In slave states color indicating African descent gave rise to a presumption that the person was a slave. This however was not the rule in other states, where every person was prima facie presumed to be free. The constitution of the United States did not leave the enforcement of the provisions for the reclamation of slaves with the states, but it vested that power in the federal government. In the preliminary proceedings before a judge or commissioner under the fugitive law, the inquiry is not strictly whether the fugitive be a slave or freeman, but whether he owes service to the claimant; and a decision in favor of the claimant does not finally fix the seal of slavery on the fugitive, but leaves the question of freedom or slavery to be inquired into in the state from whence he fled. The citizen of a slave state has a right, under the constitution and laws of the Union, to have his fugitive slave "delivered up on claim being made," and no state can defeat or obstruct this right. In a proceeding under the fugitive slave law of 1850, 9 Stat. 462, it is not necessary to produce the record showing the status of the fugitive in another state, but the fact that he owes service may be established by other and oral testimony. Article 7 of the amended constitution, U.S.C.A. which gives a right to a trial by a jury in suits at common law where the value in controversy shall exceed $20, does not apply to a preliminary examination under the fugitive slave law of Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302, as amended by Act Sept. 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, such a proceeding not being according to the course of the common-law, but constitutional and statutory. The act of congress of 1850, 9 Stat. 462, relative to the reclamation of fugitives from labor, is not unconstitutional.)
1853

DCT

Oliver v. Weakley, 18 F.Cas. 678, 2 Wall.Jr.C.C. 324, No. 10,502 (6k5)(C.C. 3,1853(In an action for damages, under Act Feb. 12, 1793, 4, 1 Stat. 302, to recover the value of escaped slaves, it is not sufficient to show merely that the defendant harbored or concealed the fugitives, but it must further be shown that such harboring and concealing caused their escape or hindered their recapture.)
1853

CirCt

Van Metre v. Mitchell, 28 F.Cas. 1036, 4 Pa. L.J. 111, 7 Pa. L.J. 115, 2 Wall.Jr.C.C. 311, No. 16,865 (C.C.W.D.Pa.,1853) Under Act February 12, 1793, 3, 1 Stat. 302, providing that, if any person shall harbor or conceal a fugitive from labor after notice that he or she is so, such person shall forfeit and pay $500, to be recovered by action of debt; saving, moreover, to the owner of such fugitive, a right of action on account of the injuries, etc., if plaintiff brings case "on account of the injuries" for which the act saves a right of action, he can recover only to the amount of actual damage which he shows he has suffered. An action will lie at common law for recovery of damages on account of the harboring and concealing of a fugitive slave. The harboring, made criminal by the act of congress, is where the purpose which the act of harboring is to encourage the fugitive in his desertion of his master, to further his escape, and to impede and hinder his reclamation. Such haboring may exist without any affectation of concealment, and yet be more injurious to the master and effective in promoting the escape of the slave and frustrating the vigilance of the master than any attempt at concealing the slave; The Pennsylvania act of assembly of 1847, so far as it authorizes resistance to masters when in pursuit of fugitive slaves, is unconstitutional; Mere acts of charity, however, as the giving food or lodging to a destitute apprentice or slave, are not made actionable where there is no such purpose or intent. The act contemplates not only an escape of a slave, but an intention on the part of the master to reclaim. Under Act February 12, 1793, 3, 1 Stat. 302, providing that, if any person shall harbor or conceal a fugitive from labor after notice that he or she is so, such person shall forfeit, etc., the word "notice" means knowledge, and "harboring" means entertaining or sheltering a fugitive with the purpose of encouraging him in his desertion of his master, with the purpose to further his escape, and to impede and frustrate the master's reclamation of him. "Harboring" is not here synonymous with "concealing," used in the same phrase with it, and there may be harboring without any concealment; Under Act Cong. February 12, 1793, providing that, "if any person shall harbor or conceal a fugitive from labor after notice that he or she is so, such person shall forfeit and pay $500, to be recovered by action of debt, saving moreover to the owner of such fugitive a right of action, on account of injuries," etc., "notice" means merely "knowledge," however obtained. Under Act February 12, 1793, 3, 1 Stat. 302, providing that if any person shall harbor or conceal a fugitive from labor, after notice that he or she is so, such person shall forfeit and pay $500, to be recovered by action of debt, saving, moreover, to the owner of such fugitive a right of action on account of the injuries, etc., if the plaintiff sues in debt for the penalty of $500, he may recover it on proof of such harboring or concealment, irrespectively of any proof of actual damage to himself. Act Pa. March 1, 1780, "for the gradual abolition of slavery," cannot have the effect of securing from punishment those who may incur the penalty prescribed by Act Cong. February 12, 1793, which provides that any person willfully obstructing the claimants in seizing or arresting fugitive slaves shall be subject to a penalty of $500)
1854

DCT

Ex parte Van Orden, 28 F.Cas. 1060, 3 Blatchf. 166, 12 N.Y.Leg.Obs. 161, No. 16,870 (C.C.N.Y.,1854)(A commissioner appointed by the United States circuit court under the fugitive slave act of Sept. 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, is not a magistrate inferior to the circuit court, and hence his proceedings are not reviewable by that court.)
1854

DCT

Gibbons v. Sloane, 10 F.Cas. 294, 6 McLean 273, 4 Am. Law Reg. 187, No. 5382 (C.C.Ohio,1854)(The power of attorney furnished by the master to his agent to enable him to arrest a fugitive slave under the act of 1850 must contain the agent's name.)
1854

DCT

U S ex rel Garland v. Morris, 26 F.Cas. 1318, 2 Am. Law Reg. 348, No. 15,811 (D.C.Wis.,1854)(A warrant for the apprehension of a fugitive slave is in full force until the final hearing and order; and after a rescue, a fresh pursuit may be made by the marshal and owner with the same warrant.The master of a fugitive slave, having been apprehended by the marshal, in pursuance of a warrant, cannot be arrested for assault and battery committed on such fugitive, while making the arrest, in aid and at the request of the marshal, before the final hearing and order of the judge.)
1854

Sct

1854

DCT

Weimer v. Sloane, 29 F.Cas. 599, 6 McLean 259, 4 Am. Law Reg. 174, No. 17,363 (D.C.Ohio,1854)(To sustain a suit for aiding or abetting in the escape of slaves, under the fugitive slave act of September 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, it must appear that the alleged fugitives were slaves who had escaped from service, and had been arrested by the owner or his agent, and that the defendant, with notice (actual or by inference) of these facts, aided and abetted their escape. Any words or actions tending to effect an escape, and which lead to that result, are sufficient to implicate the defendant in the charge of aiding or abetting the escape, under the fugitive slave act of September 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462. In an action for aiding or abetting in the escape of slaves under the fugitive slave law of September 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, it was held that a party acting as counsel for a fugitive slave is protected from the consequences of his acts so far only as they are within the proper limits of his professional duty. The counsel is not justified in assisting the escape of the slave in any mode which the law does not sanction. Under the fugitive slave law of Sept. 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, the master, or his agent, may arrest fugitive slaves without a warrant; but the agent must have a written power of attorney, executed and authenticated according to the statute.)
1855

CirCt

U S v. Darnaud, 25 F.Cas. 754, 3 Wall.Jr.C.C. 143, No. 14,918 (C.C.E.D.Pa.,1855)(Under Act May 15, 1820, c. 113, 4, 5, 3 Stat. 600, 18 U.S.C.A. 1585; 18 U.S.C.A. 3238, which punishes seizing on a foreign shore any negro or mulatto with intent to make such negro or mulatto a slave, and forcibly confining or detaining any negro or mulatto on board a vessel with intent to make him a slave, etc., ownership of the vessel by a citizen of the United States, if the accused be not himself a citizen, or citizenship of the accused if the ownership be not by such a citizen, is an essential ingredient in the offense described in such sections. In a prosecution under Act May 15, 1820, 3 Stat. 600, 18 U.S.C.A. 1585; 18 U.S.C.A. 3238, for suppressing the slave trade, the act of receiving negroes on the coast of Africa, and of confining and detaining them on shipboard, and the aiding and abetting in confining, form one transaction, and may therefore be joined together in the indictment and prosecution under different counts; but the selling and delivery of the negroes at the termination of the voyage, as on the coast of Cuba, is a distinct transaction; and if this felony is charged in the same indictment with the other, the prosecution will be made to elect on what counts it will proceed).
1856

Sct

1856

DCT

U S v. Naylor, 27 F.Cas. 78, 19 Law Rep. 449, No. 15,858 (D.C.N.Y.,1856)(Act March 22, 1794, 1 Stat. 347, 18 U.S.C.A. 429, in relation to the preparing of any vessel within the United States to sail from any port of the United States for the purpose of procuring inhabitants thereof to be transported to any foreign country to be sold as slaves was not repealed by Act March 2, 1807, 2 Stat. 426, entitled "An act to prohibit the importation of slaves into any port or place within the jurisdiction of the United States," or by Act April 20, 1818, 3 Stat. 450, entitled "An act to prohibit the introduction of slaves into any port or place within the jurisdiction of the United States," etc.)
1857

DCT

Ex parte Sifford, 22 F.Cas. 105, 5 Am. Law Reg. 659, 3 Ohio F.Dec. 483, No. 12,848 (S.D.Ohio,1857)(A sheriff having a so-called "writ of habeas corpus" under the Ohio statute of 1856, and having knowledge that the prisoner is in custody of an officer of the United States under legal process, is under no obligation to attempt to serve the writ.)
1857

DCT

U S v. Cobb, 25 F.Cas. 481, 4 Am. Law J. (N.S.) 145, 8 Leg.Int. 150, No. 14,820 (N.D.N.Y.,1857)(Where a fugitive slave is arrested and lawfully restrained of his liberty, under the provisions of Act Sept. 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, all interference by third parties, by word or act, for the purpose of favoring his escape, and tending to that result, is a violation of the act, rendering the offender amenable to its penalties.)
1858

Sct

1859

DCT

eg.Int. 316, No. 15,352, 41 Hunt Mer. Mag. 708, 4 Blatchf. 359, 4 Weekly L. Gaz. 175, 16 (356k2)(C.C.N.Y.,1859 A libel was filed against a vessel for a violation of the act against the slave trade, but no seizure of the vessel was actually made, although it was stipulated by the counsel for the claimant that a seizure had been made. Held that, under Act March 2, 1799, 89, 1 Stat. 696, the stipulation was a sufficient foundation for the entry of an order and certificate of probable cause of seizure, and that the federal district court had authority to make such order and enter the certificate.)
1859

DCT

The Orion, 18 F.Cas. 817, 4 Weekly L. Gaz. 327, No. 10,575 (S.D.N.Y.,1859)(A decree condemning a vessel for being engaged in the slave trade is supported by evidence that she was captured at the mouth of the Congo river carrying less than a half cargo of miscellaneous goods apparently selected with a view to traffic in slaves, or to be used as provisions for them, which cargo was excessively and wrongly invoiced at New York, where the vessel was chartered, at an excessive rate, and where the entire crew was changed on the day of sailing, and that the claimant could give no adequate explanation for the use of the large quantity of water casks and coppers carried.)
1860

DCT

U. S. v. Weld, 28 F.Cas. 520, McCahon 186, No. 16,660, 1 Kan.Dass.Ed. 591 (D.Kan.,1860)(If the guardian of an infant owner of a fugitive had authority to arrest the fugitive, it would be necessary, in an indictment for rescuing the fugitive from his custody after the arrest, to state the time, place, and by what authority the appointment of guardian was made. The indictment must also show that escape was from the state or territory where the service or labor was due by the laws thereof, and that defendant knew or had notice that the person arrested was a fugitive, etc.)
1860

DCT

U.S. v. Corrie, 25 F.Cas. 658, Brunn.Coll.C. 686, 23 Law Rep. 145, No. 14,869(C.C.S.C.,1860)(Under Act May 15, 1820, 3 St. at Large, p. 600, declaring certain acts by the master and crew of a vessel relative to negroes piracy, the mere landing in the United States of negroes with intent to sell them as slaves is not piracy; but it is a part of such offense that the crew landed on a foreign shore and there seized free negroes with intent to make them slaves, and confined them in the vessel from which they were landed.)
1860

DCT

U.S. v. Gould, 25 F.Cas. 1375, 8 Am. Law Reg. 525, No. 15,239(S.D.Ala.,1860)(The mode of procedure prescribed by Act April 20, 1818, 7, 28 U.S.C.A. 41(4), in relation to foreign slave trade, for enforcing the penalty for violating its provisions, is a qui tam action, and no other. Therefore, an indictment does not lie under that section. Persons imported as slaves contrary to law, against their will, are still subject to federal control, though mingled with persons in the states. The laws of the United States prohibiting the foreign slave trade are to be construed in reference to the mischief intended to be remedied, and to the nature, extent, and limits of the constitutional power of congress over this subject. Under the law prohibiting the foreign slave trade, an indictment which only charges that the accused, within this state, did hold, sell, or otherwise dispose of a negro or a slave who had previously been unlawfully imported by some other persons, without alleging that the accused did participate, aid or abet in the unlawful importation, is fatally defective.)
1860

DCT

U.S. v. Haun, 26 F.Cas. 227, 8 Am. Law Reg. 663, No. 15,329(C.C.S.D.Ala.,1860)(An indictment under Act April 20, 1818, 6, 3 Stat. 452, 18 U.S.C.A. 423, for the suppression of the African slave trade, can be sustained against one who holds, sells, or disposes of an African illegally brought into the country from any foreign kingdom, place, or country, or from sea, no less than against any person who shall illegally bring such African into the country.)
1860

Sct

Vigel v. Naylor,65 U.S. 208, 16 L.Ed. 646, 24 How. 208 (1860)(On a petition for freedom, the petitioner proved that one Kirby had emancipated all his slaves by will, some immediately, and some at a future day. In order to bring herself within this category and show that she had been the slave of Kirby, she offered to prove that her mother and brother and sister had recovered their freedom by suits brought against George Naylor, whose administrator, Henry Naylor, was the defendant in the present suit, and that it was very unusual to separate from the mother a child so young as the petitioner was at the time of Kirby's death. Held, that the evidence offered was admissible.

1806/CirCtButler v. Hopper, 4 F.Cas. 904, 1 Wash.C.C. 499, No. 2241 (C.C.Pa.,1806)(P.S. Const. art. 1, 9, which restrains congress from prohibiting the importation of slaves prior to the year 1808, does not apply to the state governments. Act Pa. March 1, 1780, declares that no person of any nation or color, except negroes registered according to the act, shall hereafter be holden as slaves within the state, but as free, except the domestic slaves attending on delegates in congress from the other states and persons passing through and sojourning in the state and not becoming resident therein. A person who formerly lived in South Carolina, where he had a plantation which he cultivated, kept a dwelling house in the City of Philadelphia, where he resided with his family, with the exception of an annual visit to his plantation. He was, during his residence in Philadelphia, a member of congress representing the state of South Carolina, with the exception of two years, during which he was a member of the legislature of the latter state. Held, on a question as to whether a slave which he brought with him to his home in Pennsylvania, and who remained with him for nearly ten years, was entitled to his freedom, that the master could not claim an exemption under the act as a member of congress, for during the two years which he was not such a member he lost the privilege which the exemption gave him, and that he could not be considered as sojourning in the state within the exception of the act. P.S. Const. art. 4, 2, which declares that "no person held to service or labor in one state under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law therein, be discharged from such service or labor," does not extend to the case of a slave voluntarily carried by his master into another state and there left under the protection of some law declaring him free)

1861

DCT

The Reindeer, 27 F.Cas. 753, 2 Cliff. 57, No. 16,144(C.C.R.I.,1861)(The fact that a vessel was in the possession of a state sheriff by virtue of an attachment issued from a state court will not operate to impair a forfeiture thereof for engaging in the slave trade, when seized by the United States marshal under Act March 22, 1794, 1, 1 Stat. 347, making a vessel liable to be prosecuted and condemned, for engaging in the slave trade, in any of the circuit or district courts where the vessel may be found and seized. Under the first section of the act of March 22, 1794, 1 Stat. 346, a vessel is liable to be prosecuted and condemned for engaging in the slave trade in any of the circuit or district courts where the vessel may be found and seized. Therefore, where a vessel had been fitted and prepared for a traffic of this kind in New York, it was held that she was properly condemned by the district court of Rhode Island, having been seized there).
1861

DCT

U S v. Gordon, 25 F.Cas. 1364, 5 Blatchf. 18, No. 15,231(C.C.N.Y.,1861)(Where a vessel is shown to have been fitted out for the purpose of engaging in the slave trade, her master, if he had control and charge of the vessel in procuring the cargo, in stowing it and in shipping the seamen, is to be held chargeable, as matter of law, with a knowledge of the intended service of the vessel. To sustain an indictment under Act May 15, 1820, 5, 3 Stat. 601, 18 U.S.C.A. 421, for "forcibly" confining negroes, it is not necessary to prove that there was physical or manual force. It is sufficient that the negroes were under moral restraint and fear-their wills controlled by superior power exercised over their minds and bodies; and any person participating in such forcible detention is a principal in the offense. It is no objection to an indictment under Act May 15, 1820, 5, 3 Stat. 601, 18 U.S.C.A. 421, for forcibly confining and detaining negroes on board a vessel with intent to make them slaves, that it describes the negroes as "not having been held to service," etc., instead of "not held to service," etc., the exact words of the statute.)
1861

DCT

U S v. Westervelt, 28 F.Cas. 529, 5 Blatchf. 30, No. 16,668(C.C.N.Y.,1861)(Under Act May 15, 1820, 4, 3 Stat. 600, 18 U.S.C.A. 422, in regard to the slave trade, the offenses prohibited may be committed by any citizen of the United States on board of any vessel, whether foreign or American. Under Act May 15, 1820, 4, 3 Stat. 600, 18 U.S.C.A. 422, it is an offense to receive negroes on board of a vessel from persons who have seized them and brought them to the vessel's side in violation of the law; and any person of the vessel's company, on board of the vessel, who is competent to commit a crime, commits such offense by voluntarily receiving, or actually participating in the reception of, the negroes on the vessel, with the intent to make them slaves.)
1861

DCT

U.S. v. the Augusta, 24 F.Cas. 892, No. 14,477(S.D.N.Y.,1861)(Where a libel in rem against a pretended whaling vessel by the United States charges that she is being fitted out with the intent to employ her in the slave trade, a court of admiralty will take judicial notice of the fact that the projected voyage would have exposed a whaler, but not a slaver, to capture by Confederate cruisers. A vessel was purchased and fitted out ostensibly for a short whaling voyage, but her outfit, admitted to be nearly complete, was entirely inadequate for such a voyage; her meat being deficient in quantity, and a large part of it tainted. No adequate preparations had been made for shipping such experienced officers and crew as were indispensable for a whaling voyage. The whaling business had ceased to be generally profitable, and her pretended voyage would have exposed a whaler, but not a slaver, to capture by Confederate cruisers. She had an immense quantity of salt, and an excess of rice, corn, beans, and firewood for a whaling voyage, with an unusual quantity of water, partly in oil casks, all suitable for a slaver. Held, that she was fitted out with the intent to employ her in the slave trade, within the meaning of Act March 22, 1794, 2, 1 Stat. 349, 18 U.S.C.A. 430, and Act April 20, 1818, 3 Stat. 450, 28 U.S.C.A. 41(4), and must, with her tackle and lading be declared forfeited to the United States.)
1862

DCT

Ex parte U.S. ex rel. Copeland, 25 F.Cas. 646, 2 Hay. & Haz. 402, No. 14865A(C.C.D.C.,1862)(The fugitive slave law of 1850 is as applicable to the District of Columbia as to any of the states, and as the circuit court of the District is a circuit court of the United States, its authority to appoint commissioners under that law is clear.)

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