Slavery Federal Cases - 1790

1790

Sct

Cowperthwaite v. Jones, 2 Dall. 55, 2 U.S. 55, 1 L.Ed. 287 ( Pa.,1790) (Where the jury, in an action on a bond given on the execution of a writ de homine replegiando, make the price of the negro slave the measure of damages, if it is accepted by the master, it will, in equity, and perhaps in law, operate as a manumission of the slave. A suit on a bond of sureties for the safe keeping of a negro slave, to which the slave was a party, has the effect of emancipation
1800

DCT

Curranee v. McQueen, 6 F.Cas. 984, 2 Paine 109, No. 3488 (C.C.)(2,1800)(C.C. One held in slavery in a foreign country who becomes free by being brought into the United States in violation of Act March 2, 1807, 4 Stat. 426, and afterwards remains in the service of his previous owner, both owner and slave believing that the latter has not obtained his freedom, cannot recover compensation for such service on an implied promise, but only on an express promise to pay.
1800

DCT

U.S. v. Bates, 24 F.Cas. 1042, No. 14,544 (1800)(. The act of congress declaring the slave trade to be piracy is constitutional.)
1801

DCT

Rose v. Kennedy, 20 F.Cas. 1188, 1 Cranch C.C. 29, 1 D.C. 29, No. 12,049 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1801)(The certificate of a justice of the peace of an oath taken by the owner of a slave who brought the slave into the state of Virginia may be read to the jury as evidence in itself that the oath required by Act Va. Dec. 17, 1792, was taken, although the oath so certified varies from that prescribed.)
1801

DCT

Sylvia v. Coryell, 23 F.Cas. 591, 1 Cranch C.C. 32, 1 D.C. 32, No. 13,713 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1801)(If the owner of a slave in Virginia send his slave out of the state for three years, and bring the slave back, it is not such a bringing into the commonwealth as entitles the slave to freedom, under Act Va. Dec. 17, 1792.)
1801

DCT

U S v. Jack, 26 F.Cas. 555, 1 Cranch C.C. 44, 1 D.C. 44, No. 15,452 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1801)(The circuit court of the District of Columbia has no jurisdiction to try a slave for larceny, but will quash the indictment and send him to a justice of the peace to be tried. By consent of parties the court will try the issue, whether slave or not.)
1802

DCT

U.S. v. Louder, 26 F.Cas. 998, 1 Cranch C.C. 103, 1 D.C. 103, No. 15,630 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1802)(The circuit court of the District of Columbia has no jurisdiction to try a slave for larceny, but will quash the indictment and send him to a justice of the peace to be tried. By consent of parties the court will try the issue, whether slave or not.)
1803

DCT

U.S. v. Vickery, 28 F.Cas. 374, 1 H. & J. 427, No. 16,619 (C.C.Md.,1803)(Where the indictment under Act May 10, 1800, 2 Stat. 70, charged that the prisoner was employed in transporting slaves from Martinique to Cumana, and the evidence produced was that he transported the slaves from Nevis to Cumana, held, that the indictment, being in the words of the statute, is sufficient without any averment of the place, which was unnecessary and mere surplusage, and that proof of the transportation from Nevis supported the indictment.)
1803

DCT

1804

DCT

Bazil v. Kennedy, 2 F.Cas. 1096, 1 Cranch C.C. 199, 1 D.C. 199, No. 1151 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1804)(On a devise that a slave should be sold for eight years, after which he should be free, the term of eight years shall begin to run from the time of the death of the testator or within a reasonable time thereafter.)
1804

DCT

McCall v. Eve, 15 F.Cas. 1232, 1 Cranch C.C. 188, 1 D.C. 188, No. 8670 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1804)(A master of a vessel is not liable to the penalty under the Virginia statute (Jan. 25, 1798, 6, 7), for carrying a slave out of the state, unless he did it knowingly.)
1805

DCT

Lee v. Lacey, 15 F.Cas. 209, 1 Cranch C.C. 263, 1 D.C. 263, No. 8193 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1805)(A master of a vessel is not liable to the penalty under the Virginia statute (Jan. 25, 1798, 6, 7), for carrying a slave out of the state, unless he did it knowingly.)
1805

DCT

Loudon v. Scott, 15 F.Cas. 940, (C.C.Dist.Col.,1805)(A slave brought into Alexandria, Va., in 1802, by a person removing from Maryland and omitting to take the oath within 60 days after his removal, is entitled to freedom under the act of December 17, 1792, although the person bringing the slave was not his owner.)
1805

Sct

1805

DCT

U.S. v. Fisher, 25 F.Cas. 1086, 1 Cranch C.C. 244, 1 D.C. 244, No. 15,101 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1805)(General reputation of freedom is sufficient to rebut the presumption of slavery arising from color.)
1806

DCT

Ben v. Scott, 3 F.Cas. 154, 1 Cranch C.C. 350, 1 D.C. 350, No. 1286 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1806)(Upon a petition for freedom the court will not require the defendant to give security for the wages of the petitioner during the litigation. An affidavit is not necessary to continue a petition for freedom at the first term.)
1806

DCT

Burr v. Dunnahoo, 4 F.Cas. 806, 1 Cranch C.C. 370, 1 D.C. 370, No. 2189 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1806)(A slave, coming from Virginia into Maryland more than a year after his master, and sold, is entitled to freedom under Acts Md.1796, c. 67.)
1806

DCT

Ex parte Anthony, 1 F.Cas. 1045, 1 Cranch C.C. 295, 1 D.C. 295, No. 485 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1806)(A justice of the peace in Alexandria cannot commit a person as a runaway, unless according to the form of Act Va. Dec. 26, 1792, p. 246.)
1806

DCT

Ex parte Letty, 15 F.Cas. 411, 1 Cranch C.C. 328, 1 D.C. 328, No. 8284 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1806)(A petitioner for freedom, in custody, will not be discharged on the request of the master, unless on security given by him to have the petitioner forth- coming, etc., to prosecute the claim for freedom.)
1806

DCT

Foster v. Simmons, 9 F.Cas. 579, 1 Cranch C.C. 316, 1 D.C. 316, No. 4983 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1806)(An importation of a slave from the county of Alexandria into the county of Washington is an importation into the state of Maryland, within the meaning of Act Md.1796, c. 67, as adopted by congress by Act Feb. 27, 1801 (2 Stat. 103).)
1806

DCT

Harrison v. Evans, 11 F.Cas. 648, 1 Cranch C.C. 364, 1 D.C. 364, No. 6135 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1806)(In an action upon the case against the owner of a stagecoach for taking away the plaintiff's slave, evidence may be given on the part of the defendant that the plaintiff had given the slave a written permission to seek a new master, and, if such permission be without limitation of time or place, the plaintiff cannot recover.)
1806

DCT

Minchin v. Docker, 17 F.Cas. 437, 1 Cranch C.C. 370, 1 D.C. 370, No. 9628 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1806)(Evidence that a black man has, for many years, publicly acted as a free man, and been generally reputed to be free, rebuts the presumption of slavery arising from color, and is evidence that he was born of a white woman.)
180 Moses v. Dunnaho, 17 F.Cas. 892, 1 Cranch C.C. 315, 1 D.C. 315, No. 9873 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1806)(A petitioner for freedom has not a right to go in search of his witnesses.)
1806 Scott v. Negro London, 3 Cranch 324, 7 U.S. 324, 2 L.Ed. 455 (U.S.Dist.Col.,1806)(A slave was brought into Virginia by a person who claimed and exercised the right of ownership over him, though he did not take the oath prescribed by the law. Eleven months after, the real owner of the slave came into the state, and within the 60 days took the oath prescribed. Held, that the slave was not entitled to his freedom)
1806 Tryphenia v. Harrison, 24 F.Cas. 252, 1 Wash.C.C. 522, No. 14,209 (C.C.Pa.,1806)(Act March 22, 1794, 46 U.S.C.A. 1351 et seq., which prohibits any citizen or resident of the United States from equipping vessels within the United States to carry on trade or traffic in slaves to any foreign country, and Act May 10, 1800, 46 U.S.C.A. 1353 et seq., which extends the prohibitions to citizens of the United States in any manner concerned in this kind of traffic, were not intended to apply to cases where slaves are carried from one foreign port to another as passengers and not for sale.)
1806 U.S. v. Butler, 25 F.Cas. 212, 1 Cranch C.C. 373, 1 D.C. 373, No. 14,697 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1806)(Assault and battery of a slave is an indictable offense.)
1807 Ben v. Scott, 3 F.Cas. 155, 1 Cranch C.C. 407, 1 D.C. 407, No. 1288 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1807)(Under Laws Md. April, 1783, c. 23, the slave imported gains his freedom by the omission of the master to prove, to the satisfaction of the naval officer or collector of taxes, that the slave had resided in one of the United States three years before importation. The general issue on a petition for freedom is that which puts in issue the simple question whether free or not.)
1807

DCT

Crease v. Parker, 6 F.Cas. 791, 1 Cranch C.C. 448, 1 D.C. 448, No. 3376 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1807)(A promise by a slave to repay money advanced to him to enable him to purchase his freedom is not binding, and it cannot be enforced, though the slave acknowledges his liability after emancipation.)
1807

DCT

Ex parte Amy, 1 F.Cas. 799, 1 Cranch C.C. 392, 1 D.C. 392, No. 340 (6k21)(C.C.Dist.Col.,1807)(Where a slave sued for freedom and was defeated, and the owner did not give the security required by law, it was held that he must pay the prison fees for the commitment and safe custody of the slave pending the suit in the county of Alexandria.)
1807

DCT

Fidelio v. Dermott, 8 F.Cas. 1175, 1 Cranch C.C. 405, 1 D.C. 405, No. 4754 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1807)(A manumission by will is not in prejudice of creditors if the real and personal estate are sufficient, without the value of the manumitted slave, to pay all the debts of the testator. The sale of a slave on the express condition that he should be free at the end of six years is not a manumission under Acts Md.1796, c. 67.)
1807

DCT

Lee v. Ramsay, 15 F.Cas. 224, 1 Cranch C.C. 435, 1 D.C. 435, No. 8200 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1807)(A parol gift of a slave in Virginia in 1784 was void under the statute of 1758, although possession accompanied and followed the gift, and it was not made valid by the act of 1787. A deed of gift of a slave in Virginia was void under the acts of 1758 and 1787, unless possession accompanied and followed the deed. A legacy of a slave gives no title till assented to by the executor.)
1807

DCT

Lucy v. Slade, 15 F.Cas. 1091, 1 Cranch C.C. 422, 1 D.C. 422, No. 8595 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1807)(Under Act Va. Dec. 17, 1792, which entitles a slave to freedom where his owner does not take a specified oath after the removal of the slave to the state of Virginia, such oath must be taken within 60 days after the removal of the slave.)
1808

DCT

Davis v. Baltzer, 7 F.Cas. 111, 1 Cranch C.C. 482, 1 D.C. 482, No. 3625 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1808)(The list of slaves brought into the state of Maryland, required by Acts Md.1796, c. 67, must be delivered to the clerk of the county into which the slaves are first brought, and within three months thereafter.)
1808

DCT

Nan v. Moxley, 17 F.Cas. 1147, 1 Cranch C.C. 523, 1 D.C. 523, No. 10,007 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1808)(The affidavit of a manumitted negro is sufficient ground for an order to issue a summons returnable immediately on a petition for freedom.)
1808 Ramsay v. Lee, 4 Cranch 401, 8 U.S. 401, 2 L.Ed. 660( U.S.Dist.Col.,1808)(In Virginia, in 1784, no gift of a slave was valid unless in writing and recorded, although possession accompanied the gift.)
1808 Spiers v. Willison, 4 Cranch 398, 8 U.S. 398, 2 L.Ed. 659(U.S.Ky.,1808)(By the Virginia act of assembly, no gift of a slave was valid unless in writing and recorded; but parol evidence may be given of the existence of a deed of gift to show the nature of possession which accompanied the deed.)
1809

DCT

U.S. v. Smith, 27 F.Cas. 1158, 4 Day 121, Brunn.Coll.C. 82, No. 16,332 (C.C.Conn.,1809)(Under Act May 10, 1800, 2 Stat. 70, the offense consists in transporting persons from one foreign country to another with a view to their being sold as slaves; and as soon as the vessel arrives at the place of destination, the offense is completed, whether the slaves are sold or not.)
1810

Sct

1810

DCT

Thomas v. Scott, 23 F.Cas. 970, 2 Cranch C.C. 2, 2 D.C. 2, No. 13,910 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1810)(Upon a petition for freedom, the defendant may appear and disclaim, without entering into the usual recognizance.)
1811

DCT

Bell v. Hogan, 3 F.Cas. 107, 2 Cranch C.C. 21, 2 D.C. 21, No. 1253 (6k3)(C.C.Dist.Col.,1811)(If a colored man was born a slave, his being permitted to go at large without restraint, and to act as a freeman, is no evidence of his being free. If plaintiff's freedom was not so notorious that defendant might be presumed to know it, defendant is not liable to damages for taking up plaintiff as a runaway; he being a colored man and, prima facie, a slave.)
1812

DCT

Preston v. McGaughey, 19 F.Cas. 1294, Brunn.Coll.C. 174, 3 Tenn. 113, Cooke 113, No. 11,397 (The issue of a female slave, during a)(particular, or life estate, belongs to the person in remainder.)
1813

DCT

Park v. Willis, 18 F.Cas. 1109, 2 Cranch C.C. 83, 2 D.C. 83, No. 10,717 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1813)(Under Act Va. Jan. 25, 1798, 6, 7, a master of a vessel is liable to the owner of a slave for his loss, if he takes the slave out of the county of Alexandria, in the District of Columbia, without a written authority from his owner, or a compliance with the other requisites of that act; and a general hiring to the defendant for 11 months, without any limitation as to the nature or place of his employment, is not such a permission as the act requires, although the plaintiff knew that the defendant's occupation was that of a master of a vessel, and the slave was a seaman. The person to whom the slave is hired is not the owner within the meaning of the statute.)
1813

DCT

U S v. Bruce, 24 F.Cas. 1279, 2 Cranch C.C. 95, 2 D.C. 95, No. 14,676 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1813)(An informal instrument of manumission, accompanied by an actual manumission of the defendant before the commission of the offense charged, followed by a formal deed of manumission after the commission of the offense, is sufficient evidence that the defendant was not a slave at the time of committing the offense.)
1814

DCT

Almeida v. Certain Slaves, 1 F.Cas. 538, 5 Hall L.J. 459, 5 Hughes 55, 3 Wheeler C.C. 538, No. 255 (D.C.S.C.,1814)(During the War of 1812 a United States privateer captured slaves on an English ship. Held, that, in consideration of the law prohibiting the importation of slaves, they could not be deemed prize, and that the court should not assume the responsibility of declaring them prisoners of war, but that the question of their disposition should be left to the government, to be treated as a matter of state policy.)
1814

DCT

Emanuel v. Ball, 8 F.Cas. 611, 2 Cranch C.C. 101, 2 D.C. 101, No. 4433 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1814)(If a slave escape from his master in Virginia, and be found in Washington, and there sold by his master, the slave does not thereby acquire a right to freedom, under Acts Md.1796, c. 67.)
1814

DCT

Garey v. Johnson, 10 F.Cas. 1, 2 Cranch C.C. 107, 2 D.C. 107, No. 5240 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1814)(Trespass vi et armis will lie for the master against one who beats his slave, though there should be no loss of service.)
1814

DCT

Simmons v. Gird, 22 F.Cas. 157, 2 Cranch C.C. 100, 2 D.C. 100, No. 12,867 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1814)(The time of a slave's sailing on a voyage from Alexandria, D. C., is not to be considered as a part of his year's residence, so as to entitle him to freedom, under Act Va. Dec. 17, 1792, 2.)
1814

DCT

Violette v. Ball, 28 F.Cas. 1218, 2 Cranch C.C. 102, 2 D.C. 102, No. 16,954 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1814)(A slave does not acquire a right to freedom by being sent from Washington to Virginia for sale, and, not being sold, brought back after eight or nine months' absence.)
1815

DCT

Fales v. Mayberry, 8 F.Cas. 970, 2 Gall. 560, No. 4622 (C.C.R.I.,1815)(No action can be maintained between parties engaged in the slave trade on any right or property growing out of their transactions therein. No action can therefore be maintained by a part owner of a ship engaged in the slave trade, against his co-owner or an agent who is a party to the original illegal traffic, for an accounting as to the profits of such a voyage on such trade.)
1815

DCT

U S v. Tom, 28 F.Cas. 200, 2 Cranch C.C. 114, 2 D.C. 114, No. 16,531 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1815)(A slave convicted of manslaughter in Alexandria, D. C., may be punished by burning in the hand and whipping.)
1816

Sct

1816

DCT

U.S. v. Pickering, 27 F.Cas. 528, 2 Cranch C.C. 117, 2 D.C. 117, No. 16,042 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1816)(An indictment will not lie under Act Va. Dec. 17, 1792, which provides that, where a person deals with a slave without the master's consent, the prosecution shall be by action on the case by the master for fourfold the value of the article bought or sold, and that a penalty of $20 may be recovered by any person who will sue for the same.)
1817

DCT

Betty v. Deneale, 3 F.Cas. 319, 2 Cranch C.C. 156, 2 D.C. 156, No. 1375 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1818)(A deed of manumission, when acknowledged and recorded, relates to the time of its execution.)
1817

Sct

1817

DCT

Thompson v. Clarke, 23 F.Cas. 1032, 2 Cranch C.C. 145, 2 D.C. 145, No. 13,951 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1817)(If a testator by his will manumits his slaves after a certain term of service, and the widow renounces the provision made for her by the will, and adheres to her rights under the law and there is sufficient personal estate to satisfy her thirds without resorting to the slaves, they will be entitled to their freedom, though the executor shall have assigned them to the widow in part satisfaction of her claim.)
1818

DCT

Bias v. Rose, 3 F.Cas. 328, 2 Cranch C.C. 159, 2 D.C. 159, No. 1382 (t.Col.,1818)(Under Act Md.1796, 3, with regard to the importation of slaves, a slave brought into the county of Washington, D. C., from Maryland, by his owner, and within three years thereafter mortgaged for his full value, does not thereby acquire a right to his freedom.)
1818

DCT

Contee v. Garner, 6 F.Cas. 361, 2 Cranch C.C. 162, 2 D.C. 162, No. 3139 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1818)(A slave cannot bind himself at law to pay money to his master, even for his freedom.)
1818

DCT

In re Susan, 23 F.Cas. 444, 2 Wheeler C.C. 594, No. 13,632 (C.C.Ind.,1818)(Act Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302, providing a procedure for the reclaiming of a fugitive slave escaping into another state, is valid, and the remedy thereunder supersedes the remedy given by state laws.)
1818

DCT

Love v. Boyd, 15 F.Cas. 992, 2 Cranch C.C. 156, 2 D.C. 156, No. 8546 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1818)(In Virginia a person who has been in possession of a slave for five years need not show the deed under which he claims title.)
1818

DCT

Sarah v. Taylor, 21 F.Cas. 431, 2 Cranch C.C. 155, 2 D.C. 155, No. 12,339 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1818)(If a female slave be sold, to serve the vendee for a term of years, with an obligation by the vendee to manumit her at the expiration of the term, and if, during the term, she has issue, such issue is entitled to freedom.)
1818

DCT

U.S. v. Godley, 25 F.Cas. 1341, 2 Cranch C.C. 153, 2 D.C. 153, No. 15,221 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1818)(In Virginia, no indictment lies at common law for stealing a slave.)
1818

DCT

Washington v. Wilson, 29 F.Cas. 359, 2 Cranch C.C. 153, 2 D.C. 153, No. 17,240 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1818)(An action on the case will lie for the loss of plaintiff's slave, though defendant wrongfully and unlawfully acquired and kept possession of the slave. In an action upon the statute of Virginia for carrying away the plaintiff's slave, evidence will not be permitted to be given that the slave had hired himself as a free man to another master of a vessel in a previous voyage.)
1819

DCT

Esam v. Green, 21 F.Cas. 284, Cranch C.C. 165, 2 D.C. 165, No. 12,275 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1819)(A slave does not acquire freedom by an importation and continuance a year in Alexandria, D. C., unless he continue there one year under the same master or owner.)
1819

DCT

The Caroline, 5 F.Cas. 90, 1 Brock 384, No. 2418 (C.C.Va.,1819)(An act of congress declares that "no person shall build, fit, equip, load, or otherwise prepare, any ship or vessel, etc., within any port of the United States, nor shall cause any ship or vessel to sail from any port of the United States for the purpose of carrying on any trade or traffic in slaves to any foreign country"; and it declares that "if any ship or vessel shall be so fitted out as aforesaid, or shall be caused to sail as aforesaid, such ship or vessel, etc., shall be forfeited to the United States," and section 2 inflicts a penalty of $2,000 on any person who shall build, fit out, etc., any such ship or vessel, knowing or intending that the same shall be so employed. Held, that the forfeiture of the vessel is not incurred by the building of the vessel for the illegal purpose aforesaid, but only for the fitting out or causing her to sail as aforesaid. An information against the vessel, which charges "that she was built, fitted, equipped, loaded, or otherwise prepared, etc., or caused to sail," for the purpose of carrying on traffic in slaves, etc., is bad for the uncertainty as to which of the several offenses is charged; and on such information a sentence of forfeiture ought not to be pronounced.)
1820

DCT

Reeler v. Robinson, 20 F.Cas. 455, 2 Cranch C.C. 220, 2 D.C. 220, No. 11,655 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1820)(After the lapse of 24 years, it will not be presumed, on a petition for freedom, that the oath, required by the law of Virginia, was taken by the person who brought the petitioner into such state when the latter was six years of age.)
1820

Sct

1820

DCT

The Wilson, 30 F.Cas. 239, 1 Brock 423, No. 17,846 (C.C.Va.,1820)(Act Feb. 28, 1803, 2 Stat. 205, forbidding any master or captain of a ship or vessel to "import" or "bring" into any port of the United States any negro, mulatto, or other person of color, under certain penalties, where the admission or importation of such persons is prohibited by the laws of such state, does not apply to colored seamen employed in navigating such ship or vessel.)
1820

DCT

U S v. Andrews, 24 F.Cas. 815, 5 City H. Rec. 120, Brunn.Coll.C. 422, No. 14,454 (C.C.N.Y.,1820)(It is sufficient on an indictment for engaging in slave trade to prove that the accused were engaged in procuring slaves, and sending them on by another vessel; it is not necessary that the vessel to which they belong should actually have had slaves on board.)
1820

DCT

U S v. Malebran, 26 F.Cas. 1145, 5 City H. Rec. 122, Brunn.Coll.C. 426, No. 15,711 (C.C.N.Y.,1820)(It is an indictable offense, under Act 1818, 3 Stat. 450, to fit, equip, load, or otherwise prepare a vessel in the United States for the purpose of transporting slaves from a foreign place to any other place.)
1821

DCT

Dunbar v. Ball, 7 F.Cas. 1185, 2 Cranch C.C. 261, 2 D.C. 261, No. 4128 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1821)(If a citizen of the United States, owning a slave in Virginia, and residing there, removes to the county of Washington, in the District of Columbia, with a bona fide intention of settling therein, and afterwards causes the said slave to be brought into said county, through the county of Alexandria, within one year after such removal, and if the owner, within three years after such removal, sell the said slave, the slave thereby becomes entitled to freedom, notwithstanding Acts May 3, 1802, 7 (2 Stat. 194), and June 24, 1812, 9 (2 Stat. 757); the said slave having been in Alexandria county merely in transitu.)
1821

DCT

Garretson v. Lingan, 10 F.Cas. 46, 2 Cranch C.C. 236, 2 D.C. 236, No. 5251 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1821)(Length of time does not raise a presumption against a slave that his owner took the oath required by Act Va. Dec. 17, 1792, under which a slave is entitled to his freedom, unless the owner takes a certain oath within 60 days after the removal of the slave to the state of Virginia.)
1821

DCT

The Francis F. Johnson, 25 F.Cas. 1200, 20 Niles Reg. 137, No. 15157A (D.C.S.C.,1821)(U.S.D.C. 1821. A vessel which cleared from Alexandria for New Orleans with a cargo of slaves, and which had on board two slaves engaged at the time of seizure, and long prior to shipping the cargo, in performing duty as members of the crew, but not rated as members thereof in the ship's articles or logbook, held not subject to forfeiture under the statute relating to the slave trade, 2 St. at Large, p. 426, because the said two slaves were not entered in the manifest as part of the cargo.)
1821

CirCt

U S v. Kennedy, 26 F.Cas. 762, 4 Wash.C.C. 91, No. 15,525 (C.C.Pa.,1821)(The master of a vessel "serves" on board the vessel, and may be punished under Act May 10, 1800, 2 Stat. 70, 18 U.S.C.A. 1586 et seq., which provides that "it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States, or other person residing therein, to serve on board any vessel of the United States employed or made use of in the transportation or carrying of slaves from one foreign country or place to another." Act May 10, 1800, 2 Stat. 70, 18 U.S.C.A. 1586 et seq., which provides that it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to serve on a vessel employed or made use of "in the transportation or carrying of slaves from one foreign country or place to another," prohibits citizens of the United States from engaging in a traffic in slaves between one foreign country and another, but the act does not apply to a case of mere transportation)
1821

DCT

U S v. Pompey, 27 F.Cas. 590, 2 Cranch C.C. 246, 2 D.C. 246, No. 16,066 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1821)(On the trial of an indictment at common law for enticing away a slave, the verdict was "Guilty," and the jury assessed the fine at $50. Held that, though the court was in doubt as to whether such an indictment would lie at common law, judgment would be entered up for the fine as assessed by the jury; no motion in arrest of judgment having been made.)
1822

DCT

Brown v. Wingard, 4 F.Cas. 438, 2 Cranch C.C. 300, 2 D.C. 300, No. 2034 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1822)(An executory contract between a master and his slave cannot be enforced either at law or in equity, and therefore a verbal agreement to give a slave his freedom on the payment of a certain amount cannot be enforced, though the master has already accepted most of the consideration.)
1822

DCT

Daniel v. Kincheloe, 6 F.Cas. 1150, 2 Cranch C.C. 295, 2 D.C. 295, No. 3561 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1822)(If the importation of a slave into the county of Washington, D. C., be with intent that he should be hired out for a limited time only, it is not such an importation as is forbidden by Acts Md.1796, c. 67, 1.)
1822

CirCt

1822

DCT

Matilda v. Mason & Moore, 16 F.Cas. 1106, 2 Cranch C.C. 343, 2 D.C. 343, No. 9280 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1822)(A person relying upon the proviso in the Virginia law in favor of persons coming to reside in Virginia, and bringing their slaves with them and taking a certain oath, must produce competent testimony to prove that the terms and conditions of the proviso had been complied with, and in the absence of all testimony no presumption can arise, from lapse of time, to supply the defect of the testimony.)
1822

DCT

Scott v. Bartleman, 21 F.Cas. 813, 2 Cranch C.C. 313, 2 D.C. 313, No. 12,524 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1822)(Where a slave is hired for a year, and he is arrested for theft during the year, and imprisoned therefor during the residue of the term for which he was hired, the one who hired the slave must pay the stipulated price for the whole term and suffer the loss of service.)
1823

DCT

Amelia v. Caldwell, 1 F.Cas. 596, 2 Cranch C.C. 418, 2 D.C. 418, No. 278 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1823)(A slave carried from Washington, in the District of Columbia, to Virginia, by her owner, for a temporary residence only, and brought back to Washington, and there sold to a resident of Washington, does not thereby become entitled to freedom under Acts Md.1796, c. 67, which prohibits the importation of slaves for sale or to reside, and provides that it may be lawful for any citizen "who shall come into this state with a bona fide intention of settling therein to import or bring into this state any slave or slaves the property of such citizen at the time of his or her said removal.")
1823

CirCt

Ex parte Simmons, 22 F.Cas. 151, 4 Wash.C.C. 396, No. 12,863 n(C.C.E.D.Pa.,1823)(The act of congress, respecting fugitives owing service and labor, does not apply to slaves brought by their masters from one state to another, who afterwards escape or refuse to return. By Act Pa. March 1, 1780, a slave, brought to Pennsylvania from a foreign state and residing there more than six months, becomes free.)
1823

DCT

Fanny v. Kell, 8 F.Cas. 995, 2 Cranch C.C. 412, 2 D.C. 412, No. 4639 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1823)(Children born of a slave mother, entitled to or promised her freedom at the end of a fixed period, are born slaves, and so continue even after the mother obtains her freedom. There can be no binding contract between a slave and his master.)
1823

DCT

Gardner v. Simpson, 9 F.Cas. 1202, 2 Cranch C.C. 405, 2 D.C. 405, No. 5237 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1823)(A Virginian slave is not entitled to freedom, under Acts Md.1796, c. 67, by being hired to a resident of the county of Washington for a limited period.)
1823

DCT

Jordan v. Sawyer, 13 F.Cas. 1101, 2 Cranch C.C. 373, 2 D.C. 373, No. 7521 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1823)(Acts Md.1796, c. 67, concerning the importation of slaves, is in force in the county of Washington, D. C., although in terms it is applicable only to the state of Maryland. A slave imported into the county of Washington, D. C., for sale, and sold within three years after such importation, is entitled to freedom, although the object and intention of both purchaser and seller were that the slave so purchased should be carried, forthwith, out of the District of Columbia, by the purchaser. To obtain freedom under Acts Md.1796, c. 67, the slave must have been imported "for sale" or "to reside.")
1823

DCT

Smallwood v. Worthington, 22 F.Cas. 367, 2 Cranch C.C. 431, 2 D.C. 431, No. 12,963 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1823)(A count averring that the defendant promised that a servant, whose time the plaintiff had bought of the defendant, had three years to serve; and that the defendant, not regarding his said promise, but contriving and fraudulently intending to injure the plaintiff, craftily and subtilely deceived the plaintiff in this, that the servant had not three years to serve, is not a count founded upon fraud, but upon the breach of the promise.)
1823

Sct

The Mary Ann, 21 U.S. 380, 5 L.Ed. 641, 8 Wheat. 380 (U.S.La.,1823)(In libel for forfeiture of a vessel under statute relating to importation of slaves, where statute inflicted a pecuniary penalty in case of vessel under 40 tons burden, and prescribed forfeiture of vessels of burden of 40 tons or more, libel should have alleged that vessel was of the burden of 40 tons or more, in accordance with the facts. Act March 2, 1807, c. 22, 8, 9, 10, 2 Stat. 429. Statute requiring captain of any vessel of the burden of 40 tons or more, sailing coastwise, and having on board any negro, to make out and deliver duplicate manifests and requiring forfeiture of any ship departing without manifests having been executed comprehends forfeiture only of vessels of 40 tons or more. The allegation in libel for forfeiture of vessel under statute prohibiting importation of slaves, that manifests required by law were not made out was sufficient on demurrer. A libel for forfeiture of a vessel which allegedly sailed from port of New York and Perth Amboy without delivering manifests to collectors or surveyors of ports of New York and Perth Amboy was defective in view of fact that law requires delivery of manifest to collector or surveyor of one port only or was defective for vagueness in not alleging with precision the port where offense was committed. Act March 2, 1807, c. 22, 2 Stat. 426.)
1823

DCT

U S v. Ellick, 25 F.Cas. 999, 2 Cranch C.C. 412, 2 D.C. 412, No. 15,042 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1823)(The circuit court of the District of Columbia has no jurisdiction in assault and battery by a slave on a white man, and will order him to be taken before a justice of the peace, to be dealt with according to law.)
1823

DCT

U.S. v. Brockett, 24 F.Cas. 1241, 2 Cranch C.C. 441, 2 D.C. 441, No. 14,651 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1823)(To cruelly, inhumanly, and maliciously cut, slash, beat, and illtreat one's own slave, is an indictable offense at common law.)
1824

DCT

Rebecca v. Pumphrey, 20 F.Cas. 384, 2 Cranch C.C. 514, 2 D.C. 514, No. 11,620 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1824)(On a petition for freedom, suggesting an apprehension that the defendant will sell and remove the petitioners from the jurisdiction of the court, supported by affidavit, a judge of the circuit court of the District of Columbia, in vacation, will order an injunction without security; and, upon further affidavit that the defendant had attempted to carry the petitioners away after notice of the filing of their petition, the judge will order the marshal to take them into his custody for safe-keeping until the defendant shall give the security required by law for their forthcoming to prosecute their petition; and if the defendant shall refuse to give such security, and if judgment shall be rendered againt him, the marshal's fees for keeping them shall be taxed in the bill of costs against the defendant.)
1824

DCT

Tarlton v. Tippett, 23 F.Cas. 702, 2 Cranch C.C. 463, 2 D.C. 463, No. 13,754 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1824)(If the owner of a slave in the county of Washington carries her to a foreign country with intent there to reside permanently, and does there reside with her for more than 12 months and is then compelled to quit that country and returns to the county of Washington, bringing the slave with him there to reside, the slave, by such importation, becomes entitled to her freedom. If, however, the owner of a slave is sent to a foreign country as a special agent of the government of the United States, at a stated salary, with an uncertainty, depending on contingencies, whether he should remain there or return after accomplishing the purpose of his mission, and is compelled to leave the country before he had actually settled himself as a permanent resident there, then the taking a slave with him and bringing her back is not an importation which will entitle her to freedom, under Acts Md.1796, c. 67.)
1824

Sct

1824

Sct

1824

CirCt

Worthington v. Preston, 30 F.Cas. 645, 4 Wash.C.C. 461, No. 18,055 (C.C.E.D.Pa.,1824)(Under the fugitive slave law of February 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302, the judge or magistrate has no power to issue a warrant to arrest the fugitive, or to commit after the examination is over and the certificate is granted, and such a warrant is wholly invalid for any purpose.
1825

DCT

Letty v. Lowe, 15 F.Cas. 411, 2 Cranch C.C. 634, 2 D.C. 634, No. 8285 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1825)(A slave, purchased by defendant, at her request, to enable her to obtain her freedom on repayment of the purchase money, must repay the whole amount before being entitled to her freedom.)
1825

DCT

Peter v. Cureton, 19 F.Cas. 312, 2 Cranch C.C. 561, 2 D.C. 561, No. 11,019 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1825)(Quaere, whether children of a female slave born while the mother was in the temporary service of a vendee for years are slaves of the vendor or vendee.)
1825

DCT

Semmes v. Sherburne, 21 F.Cas. 1059, 2 Cranch C.C. 637, 2 D.C. 637, No. 12,656 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1825)(If the plaintiff's slave be hired to the defendant in the District of Columbia, who carries her to New Hampshire without the consent or authority of the plaintiff, by means whereof she is lost to the plaintiff, he may, in trover, recover the value of the slave. But if the plaintiff assented to the defendant's taking the slave to New England either before or after he took her, and she was lost without any negligence or omission of the defendant, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover.)
1825

Sct

1825

Sct

1825

DCT

U.S. v. Clark, 25 F.Cas. 441, 2 Cranch C.C. 620, 2 D.C. 620, No. 14,802 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1825)(A slave convicted of manslaughter in Alexandria, D. C., may be punished by burning in the hand and whipping.)
1826

DCT

U.S. v. Williams, 28 F.Cas. 647, 3 Cranch C.C. 65, 3 D.C. 65, No. 16,711 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1826)(In an indictment in the District of Columbia under Acts Md.1796, c. 67, 19, for aiding and advising the transportation of a slave, there must be an averment of transportation from the District.)
1826

DCT

William v. Van Zandt, 29 F.Cas. 1286, 3 Cranch C.C. 55, 3 D.C. 55, No. 17,685 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1826)(Possession of, and acts of ownership over, a colored person, are prima facie evidence of slavery and ownership. In a suit for freedom, a judgment against the defendant, upon his disclaimer, and default in not rejoining, is not prima facie evidence of the freedom of the petitioner, in a subsequent suit by him against another defendant, although this other defendant should after such judgment, have filed a paper in that suit, claiming the petitioner as his slave.)
1827

DCT

Lee v. Preuss, 15 F.Cas. 223, 3 Cranch C.C. 112, 3 D.C. 112, No. 8199 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1827)(In the case of slaves entitled to their freedom at a future date, an injunction will not be granted to prevent their delivery to the owner on the ground of an anticipated violation of the law of the state. A petition will not lie for freedom to which slaves will be entitled at a future date.)
1827

DCT

Mandeville v. Cookenderfer, 16 F.Cas. 580, 3 Cranch C.C. 257, 3 D.C. 257, No. 9009 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1827)(In slave states color indicating African descent gave rise to a presumption that the person was a slave. In an action against a keeper of a public stage office for suffering plaintiff's slave to take passage in the stage coach, whereby he escaped, color is prima facie evidence of slavery. Every negro is prima facie to be considered as a slave and the property of somebody; and he who acts, in respect to him, as if he were a free man, acts at his peril, and the burden of proof is on him to show that the negro is not a slave, or at least to show such circumstances as will rebut the presumption arising from color. The keeper of a stage office is liable to the owner of a negro, if he permit him to take passage without the consent of the owner. The keeper of a stage office is liable to the owner of a colored slave for damages sustained by the running away of the slave, if he suffers him to take passage and depart in the stagecoach without the consent of the owner.)
1827

Sct

1827

DCT

Richard v. Van Meter, 20 F.Cas. 682, 3 Cranch C.C. 214, 3 D.C. 214, No. 11,763 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1827)(A contract between a master and his slave cannot be enforced, either at law or in equity. (An attachment for contempt will lie against a master who attempts to remove his slave out of the jurisdiction of the court after he has notice or knowledge of the slave's petition for freedom; and the court will also order the slave to be brought into court by the marshal, that he may be protected.)
1827

Sct

1827

Sct

1827

Sct

1828

DCT

Battles v. Miller, 2 F.Cas. 1037, 3 Cranch C.C. 296, 3 D.C. 296, No. 1110 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1828)(If a citizen of Virginia, the owner of a slave there, who had resided in Virginia three whole years, remove into the county of Washington with the bona fide intention to settle therein, and bring the slave with him, at the time of his removal or within one year thereafter, to reside in the said county, such importation is not contrary to law; but a sale of such slave, in the said county, within three years after such importation, may entitle him to his freedom, although made to a person residing in a state wherein slaves are lawfully held, and intending to take the said slave to such state.)
1828

DCT

Johnson v. Mason, 13 F.Cas. 771, 3 Cranch C.C. 294, 3 D.C. 294, No. 7396 (l.,1828)(If a slave be not brought into the county of Washington, D. C., for sale, or to reside permanently, he is not entitled to freedom under Acts Md.1796, c. 67.)
1828

DCT

Mandeville v. Cookendorfer, 16 F.Cas. 586, 3 Cranch C.C. 397, 3 D.C. 397, No. 9010 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1828)(It is negligence in a stage office keeper to suffer a slave to go off in the coach by means of a false certificate of freedom; and the stage owners only are liable for the damages. The principal, and not the agent, is liable for the negligence of the latter.)
1828

DCT

Murray v. Dulany, 17 F.Cas. 1047, 3 Cranch C.C. 343, 3 D.C. 343, No. 9960 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1828)(In an action by a mulatto for assault and battery, he cannot, at the trial on the general issue, be compelled to prove his freedom. In such a case the defendant waives the objection to the person of plaintiff by pleading the general issue.)
1829

DCT

Butler v. Duvall, 4 F.Cas. 898, 3 Cranch C.C. 611, 3 D.C. 611, No. 2238 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1829)(The object of the 21st section of the Maryland Act of 1796, c. 67, which enacts that slaves' petitions for freedom shall be commenced and tried only in the county where the petitioner shall reside under the direction of his master, seems to have been to prevent the filing of such petitions in the General Court and to confine the original jurisdiction in such cases to the county courts. It seems that this section is applicable only to persons claimed as slaves by residents of Maryland. Maryland Act 1796, c. 67, 21, requiring that slave's petition for freedom be commenced and tried only in county where petitioner resides under his master's direction, is not applicable to Washington County, D. C., so far as its object is to designate which of Maryland county courts shall have jurisdiction, as district contains only one county. (The remedy of petition by a slave for freedom is not confined to the Maryland courts, given jurisdiction by Maryland statute to try such petitions, nor is it necessary that the right to freedom should have accrued under the law of Maryland or in Washington County, to authorize the filing of such a petition therein. A petition for freedom is not a local action. The right is personal, and accompanies the person wherever he goes, and does not depend on any statute. A petition for freedom is an action quasi in forma pauperis; and the court ought to see that the petitioner is not entrapped in the subtleties of special pleading, and for that purpose will permit repeated amendments, especially after the other party has amended his pleadings.)
1829

Sct

1829

DCT

Wigle v. Kirby's Executor, 29 F.Cas. 1179, 3 Cranch C.C. 597, 3 D.C. 597, No. 17,631 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1829)(Slaves cannot be manumitted in Washington county, D. C., by last will, if over 45 years old at the time the manumission is to take effect.)
1830

DCT

Harris v. Alexander, 11 F.Cas. 611, 4 Cranch C.C. 1, 4 D.C. 1, No. 6113 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1830)(The right of a citizen of the United States to import a slave into the county of Washington, D. C., under Acts Md.1796, c. 67, 2, is forfeited by a sale of the slave within three years after the importation.)
1830

DCT

Maria v. White, 16 F.Cas. 732, 3 Cranch C.C. 663, 3 D.C. 663, No. 9076 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1829)(Where a member of congress takes a slave to Washington to wait on his family while attending congress, and at the end of the session he leaves the slave in Washington, she not being in a condition to be carried back with safety, and permission is given her to hire herself out and receive her wages to her own use, which she does until the return of her master, who at her request offers to sell her to her husband, a free colored man residing in Washington, and the husband fails to raise the purchase money, there is not an importation into Washington contrary to Act Md.1796, where it appears that the master, at the time of taking the slave to Washington, had no intention of importation, or that she should be sold, or should reside therein. The residence contemplated by Acts Md.1796, c. 67, 1, which provides "that it shall not be lawful to import or bring into this state, by land or water, any negro, mulatto, or other slave for sale, or to reside within this state," is a permanent residence, as contradistinguished from a sojournment. (The residence contemplated by the Maryland act, liberating slaves brought into that state for sale or residence therein, is a permanent residence as contradistinguished from a sojournment (Maryland Act 1796, ch. 67, 1) Evidence that a slave claiming freedom because of her importation into the county of Washington, D. C., contrary to the Maryland act liberating slaves brought into that state for sale or residence therein, was brought into county by her master to wait on his family while he attended Congress as delegate from slave territory and left therein at end of session until meeting of next Congress, with leave to hire herself out and receive wages to her own use, which she did until master's return, and that he offered, at her request, to sell her to her husband, who was free colored man residing in district, for stated sum, which was never paid, held not to warrant instruction to find for master, but not conclusive evidence that petitioner was brought into county for sale or residence therein (Act Maryland 1796, ch. 67, 1) Negro slave, petitioning for freedom, held not entitled to instruction that her master's offer and agreement to sell her to her husband, a free colored man residing in the District of Columbia, was evidence of her importation into the county of Washington contrary to the Maryland Act liberating slaves brought into that state for sale or residence therein, unless the jury believed from the circumstances in evidence that the master had no intention at the time of importation that petitioner should be sold or reside in such county (Act Maryland 1796, ch. 67, 1).)
1830

DCT

Quando v. Clagett, 20 F.Cas. 105, 4 Cranch C.C. 17, 4 D.C. 17, No. 11,492 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1830)(Where the whole object of a will was apparently the emancipation of slaves, specific directions being given therefor, the direction "that my man H. is to serve one year to any person that will give a fair hire for him," the proceeds to be paid one half to him and the other half to the support of another slave, will be construed as an emancipation.)
1830

DCT

Simon v. Paine's Administrator, 22 F.Cas. 163, 4 Cranch C.C. 99, 4 D.C. 99, No. 12,873 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1830)(Slaves, escaping from Maryland and suing in the District of Columbia for their freedom, will not be delivered up to the person claiming to be their owner, upon security to return them to Maryland; their claim for freedom having arisen in the District, and their witnesses residing there.)
1830

DCT

Stanback v. Waters, 22 F.Cas. 1042, 4 Cranch C.C. 2, 4 D.C. 2, No. 13,284 (Col.,1830)(In an action on the case for receiving the plaintiff's slave in Virginia and bringing him into the District of Columbia, it is not necessary to prove that the defendant knew the slave to be the slave of the plaintiff, though the scienter be averred in the declaration. Difference between the enticing of a servant, and the abduction of a slave. an action for enticing the plaintiff's slave from the service of the plaintiff, knowing him to be the plaintiff's slave, the scienter must be proved.)
1830

Sct

1831

DCT

Butler v. Duvall, 4 F.Cas. 901, 4 Cranch C.C. 167, 4 D.C. 167, No. 2239 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1831)(If slaves be removed by their owner from Virginia to the county of Washington, D.C., and there sold within three years after such removal, it may be inferred that they were imported for sale, and if so, they are entitled to freedom. Slaves carried by the owner from Virginia to Maryland, with intent to reside therein, are entitled to freedom. Slaves removed by their owner from Maryland, or Georgetown in the District of Columbia, to Virginia, and kept therein 1 whole year, are entitled to freedom under the law of Virginia, unless the owner took the oath prescribed by that law within the time thereby limited; but after the lapse of 25 or 30 years, it may be presumed that such oath was taken as prescribed, and within the limited time.)
1831

DCT

Gilbert v. Ward, 10 F.Cas. 348, 4 Cranch C.C. 171, 4 D.C. 171, No. 5415 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1831)(On a petition for freedom under a will, the burden of proof is on the respondent to show that the petitioner was more than 45 years of age, or that the manumission was in prejudice of creditors, and that, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to freedom under Act. Md.1796, c. 67, 13.)
1831

DCT

Kitty v. McPherson, 14 F.Cas. 709, 4 Cranch C.C. 172, 4 D.C. 172, No. 7860 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1831)(A slave, manumitted by will after a term of service, is not free until the term of service has expired; but the court will continue the injunction originally granted to prevent the removal of the petitioner from the jurisdiction of the court, unless the defendant will give bond to the United States, with good security, that he will not suffer or permit her to be so removed.)
1831

DCT

Mary v. Talburt, 16 F.Cas. 949, 4 Cranch C.C. 187, 4 D.C. 187, No. 9192 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1831)(Where a slave brought into the county of Washington, D. C., from Virginia by her owner afterwards runs away and her owner sells her "running," she does not thereby lose the benefit of the provision of Acts Md.1796, providing that a slave, under certain circumstances, shall be free, if imported for sale or to reside. Where a person goes to Washington county, D.C., to reside, he may, under Acts Md.1796, c. 67, 2, lawfully bring his slaves with him; but if he sells them within three years after his removal, he loses the benefit of the exception in his favor contained in such section, and the slaves are entitled to their freedom under section 1 of such act.)
1831

Sct

1831

DCT

Samuel v. Childs, 21 F.Cas. 306, 4 Cranch C.C. 189, 4 D.C. 189, No. 12,287 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1831)(Children born of a slave mother, entitled to or promised her freedom at the end of a fixed period, are born slaves, and so continue even after the mother obtains her freedom. Two witnesses are necessary to a deed of manumission under Acts Md.1796, c. 67, 29.)
1832

DCT

Delilah v. Jacobs, 7 F.Cas. 415, 4 Cranch C.C. 238, 4 D.C. 238, No. 3773 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1832)(Section 12 of the compact between Virginia and Maryland which authorizes the citizens of each state to bring their effects into the other state free of duty, does not prevent one state from prohibiting the importation of slaves from the other.)
1832

DCT

Esther v. Buckner, 8 F.Cas. 797, 4 Cranch C.C. 253, 4 D.C. 253, No. 4537 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1832)(But if he did perfectly, entirely, and completely remove to the city of Washington, and had rented a house and put some part of his family and furniture into it, and claimed the privileges of a resident of that city on or before November, 1826, though he had not removed all his family and property, it was competent for him to bring the rest of his family and furniture to Washington after his removal, and his so bringing them after his said removal did not prevent his being a resident on or before November, 1826. A citizen and resident of Virginia commenced, bona fide, removing his furniture and family to Washington, D. C., in November, 1826, and continued such act of removal bona fide, at intervals during the month of December and up to January 7, 1827, and then, within one year thereafter, introduced the petitioners into the county of Washington, D. C. The court held that the petitioners were not thereby entitled to freedom.
1833

CirCt

1833

DCT

Moore v. Jacobs, 17 F.Cas. 686, 4 Cranch C.C. 312, 4 D.C. 312, No. 9767 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1833)(A slave, owned in Alexandria, D. C., was removed with her owner to Maryland to reside. She ran away from her owner in Maryland and came to Alexandria; her owner in Maryland selling her (running) to a resident of Alexandria. Held, that the escape of the slave into Alexandria was not a voluntary importation into Alexandria, and the sale was not such a sale as could give her a right to freedom under Acts Md.1796, c. 67.)
1833

DCT

U.S. v. Johnson, 26 F.Cas. 625, 4 Cranch C.C. 303, 4 D.C. 303, No. 15,486 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1833)(In an indictment under Acts Md.1796, c. 67, 19, for assisting, by advice, the transporting of a slave, whereby his owner was deprived of the service of his slave, it is not necessary to state what the advice was or how it assisted; and it is not necessary to state a criminal intent, or that the accused knew he was a slave and intended to run away.)
1833

DCT

U.S. v. Prout, 27 F.Cas. 625, 4 Cranch C.C. 301, 4 D.C. 301, No. 16,094 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1833)(On conviction of a free person on an indictment under Acts Md.1751, c. 14, 10, for enticing a slave to run away, where it appears that the latter actually ran away, the offender may be fined under Acts Md.1796, c. 67, 19, without an averment of loss of the service of such slave by the master. A count in an indictment under Acts Md.1796, c. 67, 19, for giving a pass to a slave, is bad where it does not aver that the master or owner was thereby deprived of the service of his slave.)
1834

DCT

Bowman v. Barron, 3 F.Cas. 1075, 4 Cranch C.C. 450, 4 D.C. 450, No. 1738 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1834)(A Virginia slave of a Virginia owner was loaned by the widow to her son-in-law in Washington, D. C., until the estate should be settled and distribution made. The slave resided in Washington, under that loan, more than a year, and was then sent back to Virginia, and on settlement of the estate was assigned to one of the distributees. Held, that the slave did not thereby acquire a right to freedom under Acts Md.1796, c. 67, although the administrator, who was neither party nor privy to the lending, afterwards knew of it and did not object.)
1834

DCT

Brooks v. Nutt, 4 F.Cas. 297, 4 Cranch C.C. 470, 4 D.C. 470, No. 1958 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1834)(Children born of a slave mother, entitled to or promised her freedom at the end of a fixed period, are born slaves, and so continue even after the mother obtains her freedom.)
1834

DCT

Chapman v. Fenwick, 5 F.Cas. 477, 4 Cranch C.C. 431, 4 D.C. 431, No. 2604 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1834)(Under Act Md.1796, c. 67, 13, which provides in part that "no manumission hereafter to be made by will shall be effectual to give freedom to any slave or slaves, if the same shall be in prejudice of creditors," the burden of proof lies on the creditors to show that an emancipation by will is in their prejudice. Where testatrix charged her land and her personalty with her debts and legacies, and emancipated her slaves, and her personal estate was not sufficient without the slaves, but with the real estate was more than sufficient, the slaves were entitled to their freedom. Emancipation by will stands on stronger ground than a specific legacy, and does not need the assent of the executor. If the manumission is to be considered as a specific legacy, the assent of the executor was given by suffering the negroes to go at large as free for a period of eight years after the death of the testatrix. A testatrix charged her lands, as well as her personal assets, with the payment of her debts and legacies, and by her will manumitted certain of her slaves, to take effect at her death.)
1834

DCT

Crawford v. Slye, 6 F.Cas. 778, 4 Cranch C.C. 457, 4 D.C. 457, No. 3371 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1834)(The list of imported slaves, required by Acts Md.1796, c. 67, 11, must designate the sex. The name "Jo" does not designate the sex.)
1834

DCT

Hobbs v. Magruder, 12 F.Cas. 265, 4 Cranch C.C. 429, 4 D.C. 429, No. 6551 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1834)(The sale, in the District of Columbia, of a Maryland slave, brought to the District by his owner, does not give the slave a title to freedom under Acts Md.1817, c. 112, which prohibits the sale to a nonresident of the state, of any slave having a contingent right to freedom.)
1834

DCT

In re Runaways and Petitioners for Freedom, 21 F.Cas. 1, 4 Cranch C.C. 489, 4 D.C. 489, No. 12,137 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1834)(The marshal has not a right to include, in his account against the United States, his imprisonment fees for persons committed in the District of Columbia as runaway servants or slaves, under the adopted laws of Maryland.)
1834

DCT

Janes v. Buzzard, 13 F.Cas. 344, Hempst. 240, No. 7206A (Super.Ark.,1834)(The fact of liability to pay the value of a hired slave, in case he run away, is inadmissible in evidence, in an action by the master against the hirer for the value of his service for the balance of the term of hiring and after he had run away, to affect the value of his services. In an action of assumpsit for the work of slaves, a petition alleging that the work was performed by certain negro slaves, servants of plaintiff, is sufficient, since assumpsit is maintainable as well to recover for the labor of servants as for that of slaves for life. A person who hires the slave of another is responsible for hire, though the negro may run away before the expiration of the time, and the fact that the possessor may be responsible for the value of the slave in the event of running away will not at all diminish the claim to hire.)
1834

DCT

Keziah v. Slye, 14 F.Cas. 451, 4 Cranch C.C. 463, 4 D.C. 463, No. 7752 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1834)(A slave imported into the county of Washington, D. C., from Virginia, under Acts Md.1796, c. 67, 9, is entitled to freedom, unless recorded within three months thereafter.)
1834

Sct

1834

DCT

U.S. v. Lloyd, 26 F.Cas. 986, 4 Cranch C.C. 468, 4 D.C. 468, No. 15,617 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1834)(A simple assault and battery on a slave is not an indictable offense. Such an assault, even with intent to murder him, is not an offense at common law. The owner of a slave who beats him cruelly, and exposes him, so beaten, to public view, is guilty of a misdemeanor at common law.)

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Vernellia R. Randall
Professor Emerita of Law

The University of Dayton
School of Law
Dayton, OH 45469-2772
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