Innocent Whites and Colorblindness
Innocent Whites, Racial Politics, Exploitation and Colorblindness
A pervasive argument against affirmative action is that it
actually creates or exacerbates racial problems. A common version
of this argument is the concern about racial politics. For
example, consider Richmond v. J.A. Crosen Co. In that case
Richmond, Virginia, with five of the nine city council seats held
by African-Americans, enacted an affirmative action plan for city
construction contacts. Justice Scalia charged that this
"set-aside clearly and directly benefi[tted] the dominant
political group, which happens also to be the dominant racial
group." Another version of the same point is the claim that
affirmative action programs injure "innocent whites,"
thereby encouraging the growth of white-supremacy groups. One
final version argues that affirmative action is susceptible to
exploitation because these programs proportedly benefit only
middle-class African- Americans who do not need the help as much
as those in lower socio-economic classes.
These related concerns are secondary arguments that arise from
a combination of individuality and merit. Essential individualism
and absolute standards can work well together. Absolute standards
rhetorically support defining individuality as essential
individualism because the most objective judgments of merit are
useless if the social unit they measure is unstable. A historical
understanding of how individuals and groups interrelate might be
sufficiently stable for such an objective measure. Its historical
nature, however, undermines claims that merit rather than history
is responsible for the measured differences. Absolute merit
standards also support the choice of essential individualism
because merit determines the distribution of economic benefits
and burdens. The social structure in this country, given the norm
of private property, distributes rewards and punishments to the
essential individual.
Conversely, the choice of essential individualism helps define
merit as absolute standards. Individuality implies that absolute
standards are appropriate because relative standards would
require an inquiry into the difficulty of overcoming various
obstacles. This inquiry would examine how others with the same
social and cultural backgrounds deal with the obstacle. Thus
given essential individualism, merit must be absolute standards
to avoid such a group-based inquiry.
If merit is absolute standards and people are essentially
individuals, racial politics and exploitation are wrong because
essential individuals receive benefits or burdens for reasons
other than merit. Merit should determine the distribution of
benefits and burdens. Racial politics are wrong because they
ignore these standards in distributing goods to particular
political interest groups, all the while masquerading as civil
rights that benefit society as a whole. Individuality dictates
the level at which to look for harms and benefits. Thus, the
harms are to Allan Bakke, Wendy Wygant, and Brian Weber; the
beneficiaries are Carl Stotts, and Philip Paradise, Jr.
"Innocent whites" are the victims of these
politics.
The exploitation argument parallels the racial politics
argument, except the context is the African-American community
rather than society as a whole. According to this argument,
exploitation is wrong because middle-class African- Americans do
not automatically deserve more than middle-class Euro-Americans.
Affirmative action distributes goods to individuals who do not
need the help, under the guise of helping individuals that do.
These poorer African- Americans are the innocent victims of this
exploitation.
More intriguing than how individuality and merit work
together, though, is the tension between these arguments and the
other primary term, colorblindness. The "innocent
whites" form of the argument exposes the tension by its
reference to the adversely affected party's race. This argument
acknowledges that race is real, that it does have a stable
meaning within our culture. Such an acknowledgement is
catastrophic for colorblindness, which has as its major premise
that race is not stable enough to use in judicial decision
making. Most opponents of affirmative action, however, avoid this
tension by using the rhetoric of individuality to remove the
explicit reference to racial groups. They simply refer to the
alleged victims as innocent "others." . . . . The
racial politics argument could violate colorblindness in the same
way the term "innocent whites" does. For example, the
concern only about African-Americans taking over a specific
polity. The racial politics argument conflicts with
colorblindness in a more fundamental way, however. For racial
politics even to be possible, race must be something more than an
arbitrary, meaningless grouping. Many of the opponents of
affirmative action believe politics is nothing more than special
interest groups competing for scarce political resources. These
interest groups require some form of group identity and
similarity of interest. Therefore, if racial politics are
possible, race must be something more than arbitrary groupings.
The races must have meaningful identities.
The exploitation argument conflicts with colorblindness for
the same reasons. Arguing that some African-Americans exploit
affirmative action programs requires a definition of the intended
beneficiaries of affirmative action. Any such definition
necessarily will be a definition of what it means to be an
African-American, or a member of some other racially defined
group. The assumption behind the exploitation argument is that
middle-class African- Americans are not really African-Americans
because they are not disadvantaged enough. Making this argument,
however, admits the possibility of accurately defining racial
groups. Exploitation, like racial politics, can occur only if
racial categories have meaning. This admission directly conflicts
with the idea of colorblindness, which argues that race is
inherently arbitrary. A slightly more sophisticated version of
the racial politics argument implicitly acknowledges the societal
existence of different races. In this version, opponents of
affirmative action argue that although race socially exists, it
evades legal definition. Therefore, legal acknowledgement would
lead to intractable political battles and further racial strife.
This argument is ultimately self-defeating, because
colorblindness draws just as much attention to race as does race-
consciousness. If courts cannot define race, they can neither
follow racial divisions nor ignore them because they do not know
what to follow or ignore. If "African-American" is too
unstable to use in an affirmative action plan because it means
too many things, it is equally unstable to determine whether or
not the term falls within a particular category of prohibited
terms. The only way for colorblindness to function is for it to
adopt an implicit definition of race. Thus, acknowledging race
and not acknowledging race equally exacerbate racial tensions by
asking the same questions: What are the race words? By what test
do we know they are race words? How can we legally use these
words? Moreover, admitting the existence of race, while denying
its importance, is likely to be counterproductive. There is no
particular reason to believe that if the law ignores race, race
will go away. Instead, ignoring the social importance of race
ensures its perpetuation because courts could not intervene in
racial politics unless the victor erred and used a prohibited
racial classification. Acknowledging that racial classifications
do not create race or racial politics leaves the law in a
precarious position. If race is a problem that exists beyond
racial classifications, and if the courts can police only for
racial classifications, courts are impotent to directly address
racial problems.
There is an even more confounding aspect to the concern about
racial politics, however. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
Justice O'Connor hesitantly notes that African-Americans were on
or just over the verge of majority status in Richmond, thereby
raising the specter of racial politics. Simultaneously, she
avoided holding that racial composition of the relevant political
unit is a legitimate part of equal protection analysis. The
reason for Justice O'Connor's tight-rope act is obvious. A racial
analysis of the political units that adopt laws would have a
dramatic impact on equal protection law. Less obvious is the
troubling assumption behind such a vision of racial politics. The
perception is that only minority racial groups engage in racial
politics. Perhaps this belief stems from a sense that
Euro-Americans are not a race. Therefore, Euro-Americans are
incapable of racial politics by definition. In Wygant v. Board of
Educ., Justice White's concurrence fuels these suspicions. He
writes: "This policy requires laying off nonminority
teachers solely on the basis of their race . . ., and retaining
other teachers solely because they are black." Justice White
makes two telling points. First, Euro-Americans have defined
their ethnic heritage only in the negative-"nonminorities."
Second, Justice White names the African-American race as
"black" rather than just using the word
"race" as he did for Euro-Americans. This shift infers
that "black" has some positive meaning, while
"white" is virtually without meaning. Justice Scalia's
opinion in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. confirms these
suspicions. Attempting to distinguish Fullilove v. Klutznick, he
argues that "racial discrimination against any group finds a
more ready expression at state and local levels than at the
Federal level." This equation of racial politics with local
politics assumes no racial group is large enough to capture the
national political structure. Such an assumption must rest on the
perception of Euro-Americans as a nonrace.
Euro-Americans must lose their ethnicity to maintain the
neutrality of colorblindness. If colorblindness requires some
image of race to function, as the racial politics argument
tacitly acknowledges, the model will be the nonrace of
Euro-Americans. Few outside the Euro-American community would
accept such a model as neutral. That Euro-Americans can accept
such a model is testimony to their fear of racial guilt.
At the heart of colorblindness lies Euro-Americans' racial
guilt. Euro- Americans can attempt to deny that guilt by denying
they are a race. Analyzing the specter of African-American racial
politics, however, reveals the concern is really about
Euro-American politics. Thus, the racial politics argument, by
relying on merit and individuality, contradicts colorblindness.
Attempts to resolve this problem reveal the Euro-Americans at the
center of colorblindness, denying they are any race at all. [BACK]
Reconsidering
Strict Scrutiny Of Affirmative Action
Constitutional history is repeating itself. One hundred years
after adoption of its now discredited "separate but
equal" doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson, the U.S. Supreme
Court is once again directing the future course of race relations
in the country. Just as it did more than a century ago in
overseeing the demise of Reconstruction, the Supreme Court is
obstructing yet another national consensus supporting affirmative
measures to eliminate systemic discrimination from American
society. By narrow majorities, the Court has meticulously laid
the groundwork for a new and untested colorblind jurisprudence,
with the ultimate aim of invalidating government use of
race-conscious affirmative action as an instrument of public
policy in dismantling entrenched patterns of systemic
discrimination against minorities and women. . . . But a
constitutional requirement of "colorblindness" would
bar all uses of racial classifications by state and local
government, including the use of race-conscious programs to end
systemic discrimination. Such a requirement, however, is
supported neither by the original intent of the framers nor by
the history of the Equal Protection Clause. It would also
represent a radical departure from fifty-eight years of modern
equal protection jurisprudence. . . .
Race and gender discrimination spans the socioeconomic
spectrum. In fact, the effects of discrimination may be more
pronounced at the top of the economic ladder, where the power,
prestige, and monetary stakes are at their greatest. Though often
related, discrimination and socioeconomic disadvantage present
distinct problems that require distinct solutions. Limiting
affirmative action to "social and economic
disadvantage," as some have proposed, would not effectively
address the "glass ceiling" phenomenon. While
minorities and women in corporate management suffer no economic
disadvantage, too often they are still the victims of race and
gender discrimination. . . . Under the artificial constraints of
strict scrutiny, however, the courts are free to veto the
government's choice of more effective, race- conscious means. The
Supreme Court's unfortunate and ill-conceived adoption of strict
scrutiny as the constitutional standard for reviewing race-
conscious affirmative action should be reconsidered for several
reasons.
First, comprehensive remedies for historic and systemic
discrimination against minorities and women are proper subjects
for legislative and executive--rather than judicial--resolution.
In strictly reviewing policy determinations by the politically
accountable branches of government, the courts have exceeded
their proper constitutional role. The Supreme Court's rejection
of "societal discrimination" as a basis for remedial
action by government simply underscores the inappropriateness of
applying strict scrutiny--within the context of individual
"reverse discrimination" claims--to broadly based
social policies.
Second, even assuming certain constitutional limits on the use
of race- conscious affirmative action, the use of strict scrutiny
to create a "colorblind jurisprudence" displaces more
than half a century of settled equal protection doctrine.
Third, the inconsistent application of strict scrutiny by
state and federal courts has undermined legitimate efforts to
dismantle systemic discrimination in public employment,
contracting, and higher education.
Vernellia R. Randall
Professor of Law
The University of Dayton
School of Law
Dayton, OH 45469-2772
This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
