Abstract

Excerpted From: Dushiyanthini(Toni) Kenthirarajah, Nicholas P. Camp, Gregory M. Walton, Aaron C. Kay and Geoffrey L. Cohen, Does “Jamal” Receive a Harsher Sentence than “James”? First-name Bias in the Criminal Sentencing of Black Men, 47 Law and Human Behavior 169(February, 2023)(5 Footnotes/References)(Full Document)

Although racial--ethnic inequalities in incarceration rates are high around the world, they are extreme in the United States. Black men constitute 38% of the U.S. prison population but only 6% of the U.S. adult population. Decades of research in criminology, legal studies, and sociology document the contribution of sentencing biases to these disparities. By some estimates, Black citizens receive sentences that are almost 10% longer than those of Whites charged with the same crimes, despite state penal systems' adoption of sentencing guidelines designed to prevent racial discrimination.

These disparities impose a tremendous cost on individuals and communities. Incarceration prevents people from working and contributing to society, from providing for and spending time with their family, and from leading a free life; it also negatively affects major downstream life outcomes such as well-being, employment, economic mobility, and educational and financial attainment of their children. Imprisonment depresses civic participation through formal disenfranchisement and institutional distrust. The longer someone is incarcerated, the more severe these impacts.

Given the harms of incarceration and the profound disparities in who shoulders these burdens, it is crucial to identify biases that influence incarceration decisions. In the present research, we examined how distinctions made among members of a given racial group contribute to racial bias in criminal sentencing. Psychological research suggests that people assign individuals to a subtype within social categories such as race. They infer what kind of group member a person is based on subtle cues and treat them accordingly. Even among individuals categorized as Black or White, Black individuals who have more Afrocentric features are more likely to be stereotyped as criminals and, in some circumstances, even more likely to be sentenced to death; likewise, White individuals who appear more stereotypically White are less likely to be the victims of excessive force(Kahn et al., 2016). Here, we examined within-group racial biases in criminal sentencing as a function of another cue: the racial stereotypicality of a person's given name.

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As defendants move through the criminal justice system--from arrest to probationary hearings--racial bias can amplify at each step. Indeed, racial disparities are apparent in citizens' contacts with law enforcement, in citizens' experiences with the court system, and in the downstream consequences of incarceration. Although the racial disparities between Black and White Americans are striking, disparities among members of historically marginalized groups provide another, less apparent window onto racism in the criminal justice system. Yet, these dynamics can themselves drive racial disparities. In our sample, we found that racial disparities in sentencing were driven by first-name biases, so much so that they became statistically nonsignificant after we accounted for the racial stereotypicality of defendants' first names.

Such processes may also inform where and to what extent a first-name bias is likely to play out at earlier junctures in the criminal justice system and, if so, how it could be remedied. Racial disparities in sentencing decisions are certainly shaped by judicial discretion, but they are also influenced by prosecutors' decisions, such as whether to press charges that carry binding minimum sentences. Do first names influence whom prosecutors decide to charge and with what, or who is ultimately convicted? Insofar as more than 90% of cases are plea bargained(Devers, 2011), how does the first-name bias affect social dynamics in the plea-bargaining process among judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel? The approach we applied to sentencing can be applied to these and other steps of the judicial process to map the course of the first-name bias through the criminal justice system.

Another key direction for future research involves understanding the contextual factors that may contribute to or reduce first-name bias. For instance, it is possible that the first-name bias is particularly pronounced in criminal justice contexts because this setting limits the influence of other subtyping cues. Inmates often wear prison uniforms(limiting sartorial cues) and have defense counsel speak for them(reducing accent signifiers); however, their names are repeated time and again, both in face-to-face exchanges and in written records.

Indeed, name-based associations may exert even more influence when reforms attempt to debias decision-making by removing other sources of information. For example, one audit study examined callback rates for job applications submitted with distinctly Black versus White male names during the implementation of “ban-the-box” laws, which restrict employers from asking about applicants' criminal history. These laws were meant to promote equity, as racial disparities throughout the criminal justice system result in more Black men having criminal records. However, removing these questions increased racial gaps in callback rates more than sixfold. Employers appeared to infer applicants' criminal histories on the basis of racial associations with their first names.

These findings both illustrate the pernicious influence of first-name biases and raise an important question: Would making first names less salient in sentencing decisions, such as by referring to defendants by their last names, attenuate some of the biases we observed or merely displace them? More broadly, what is the proper remedy for first-name bias? Removing first-name cues entirely could dehumanize defendants in the eyes of judges and jurors, reducing the defendant to a dehumanized number or set of initials. Instead, it may be more beneficial to inform legal decision makers of the biases, either through training or explicit instruction during the sentencing instructions. As we described above, first-name biases may feel innocuous because they draw on individuating cues to distinguish among members of a group rather than between groups. Thus, awareness itself is an important if insufficient first step.

The scope of first-name bias and its proper remedy are important empirical questions for researchers and practitioners to consider. However, we demonstrated the cost of inaction: The state deprived some Black men of their liberty for nothing more than their name.

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Jennifer S. Hunt served as Action Editor.

Nicholas P. Camp(iD) https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9704-6133