Cases (Federal/State)

    • Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001)

The Supreme Court of the United States decided this case in January of 2003. Respondent, a driver’s license applicant brought this class action suit to challenge the Alabama Division Public Safety’s policy of administering its driver’s license exam in English only. The respondent argued that the practice was in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that prohibits discrimination in covered programs and activities. Respondent argued that administering the exam in English only was discriminatory towards non-speaking test takers. The District Court enjoined English only administration of the exam. The Court of Appeals affirmed. In reversing the Court of Appeals decision, the Supreme Court held that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act provides no private right of action to enforce disparate impact regulations. The Court went on to provide that Title VI only protects individuals against intentional acts of discrimination. The case is not directly relate to the above thesis statement but does address regulations that have a disparate impact on a minority group.  

    • Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996)

The Supreme Court of the United States decided this case in June of 1996. Two plainclothes policemen who were patrolling a high drug area pulled over the petitioners in their jeep. The police officers relied on the suspicious driving of the petitioners to satisfy the probable clause requirement. Upon approaching the vehicle, the police saw bags of crack cocaine in the hands of the petitioner. They were arrested on federal drug charges. The District Court convicted the petitioners on the federal drug charges. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The petitioners argued that the crack cocaine should be suppressed as the grounds for the police officers’ traffic stop was pretextual and in violation of their fourth amendment rights. The case addresses the issue of non-white motorists being stopped for minor traffic violations that may not have resulted in the stopping of white motorists. The Court held that the stop was not in violation of the petitioners’ fourth amendment rights and that the “reasonable officer” test is not determinative of whether probable cause exists to stop a vehicle.

    • U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)

The Supreme Court of the United States decided this case in June of 1975. Two police officers were observing traffic at the San Diego border. The officers stopped Brignoni-Ponce because, according to the officers, he and his two passengers looked like Mexicans. After the traffic stop, the officers discovered the two passengers were illegal’s and Brignoni-Ponce was convicted on two counts of transporting illegal immigrants. The Supreme Court examined whether race could be the sole factor for an officer to stop a vehicle. The Court held that under appropriate circumstances, a roving patrol may perform a limited search and seizure without having probable cause to arrest the person. These circumstances include information that the person may have drugs or weapons, a visual scan of the person’s vehicle reveals something suspicious or as in this case a visual reason to believe that the person is carrying illegal aliens in to the country. Although the court found that none of these circumstances were present in this case, the decision, in effect gave broad discretion to law enforcement agents to perform traffic stops in the absence of traditional probable cause.

    • Com. v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, 691 (Mass. 2008)

This case was decided by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 2008. A Massachusetts state trooper followed a car for three-quarters of a mile until he was able to see that the two occupants of the vehicle were dark skinned. The state trooper pulled the vehicle over. The vehicle had been neither speeding nor swerving prior to being pulled over by the state trooper. Cocaine was discovered in the vehicle and the drive was charged with trafficking cocaine. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence of the cocaine on the basis that the stop was not warranted by probable cause. In the course of the defense, counsel studied the amount of traffic citations given to African Americans as opposed to whites. The number was significantly disproportionate to the racial make-up of the town. African Americans accounted for 0.6 percent of the town’s population and nearly 12 percent of the traffic citations given. The suppression of the evidence by the lower court was reversed by the Supreme Court which held that the burden was on the defendant to show that produce evidence that similarly situated persons were treated differently because of their race. This case set precedent that allowed evidence, produced from a traffic stop in which an officer admittedly pulled a vehicle over on the sole basis of the occupants’ race, to be used in court.

    • Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)

This case was decided by the Supreme Court in 1968. The case involved a Cleveland police detective who two men acting in a way he thought was suspicious. Acting on nothing more than his own suspicions, the detective approached the men and asked them their names. The detective eventually patted the men down and found a weapon on one of them. The defendants asserted that the search was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court held police may perform a quick surface search of the person’s outer clothing for weapons if they have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is armed. This reasonable suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable facts" and not merely upon an officer's hunch. This standard proved vital to the effort to stop racial profiling. It aimed to make sure that officers could not merely pull over, seize or search people based solely on their race but rather needed to have reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts.